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Abstract 
Community-Based Health Insurance Schemes (CBHIs) have flourished all over the developing 
world. CBHI is a not-for-profit type of health insurance that has been used by poor people to 
protect themselves against the high costs of seeking medical care and treatment for illness. In 
principle, CBHI schemes are designed for people who live and work in rural areas, or in the 
informal sector. Most often, these people are unable to access adequate public, private, or 
employer-sponsored health insurance. Significantly, by reaching those who would otherwise 
have no financial protection against the cost of illness, CBHIs also contribute to equity in the 
health sector. However, many schemes do not perform well due to a number of problems related 
to their implementation.  This study examines then the problems related to the implementation of 
CBHIs in the developing world. In addition, the study presents possible strategies to overcome 
those problems. It also draws lessons from the case of Rwanda, generally considered a success 
story in the implementation of CBHIs. 
  
Methodologically, extensive literature review and informal interviews are two methods used to 
tackle the research questions.    
The review found that the main challenges of CBHI are related to insurance risks that include 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  There are also challenges related to the context in which 
CBHIs are launched such as the absence of formal insurance culture and poverty, which lead to 
low levels of revenues that can be mobilized from poor communities. Furthermore, the study 
discusses problems related to design features that hinder the performance of CBHI. Those 
problems include, among others, the small size of the risk pool, under pricing and the limited 
management capacity that exists in rural and low-income contexts. 
 
 To remedy to those problems, the literature proposes different strategies: increased and well 
targeted subsidies to pay for the premiums of low income populations; educational and 
awareness-raising programs for behavior change; mandatory enrollment to fight against adverse 
selection; regular training to enhance management skills; and community participation  
Finally, the study draws lessons from success stories of implementation in Rwanda.  
Key words: social protection, Social risk management, good governance, poverty and culture 
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 PART I: INTRODUCTION AND METHODS 
 
I.1 INTRODUCTION 
I.1.1 Background of CBHIs in developing countries 
Thirty-five years after the Declaration of Alma-Ata1, an estimated 1.3 billion people worldwide 
still lack access to the most basic levels of health care. Although the right to social security and 
health is well established in international law, governments and international donors are still 
failing in their responsibility to guarantee these rights to millions of people. In poor countries, 
the challenge is to finance systems that will deliver that right (Appiah-Denkyira and Preker, 
2005).  
Throughout decades of underfunding of health systems by governments as well as donors, an 
important mechanism for financing health care in poor countries has been user fees. However, 
there is now a growing international consensus that user fees are an inequitable form of 
financing, an impediment to health access, and a cause of impoverishment, and that concrete 
measures need to be taken to abolish them. Each year, 100 million people are pushed into 
poverty by the need to pay for health care (Joint NGO 2008, 4).    
Residents of rural communities are often unable to obtain necessary medical care outside of the 
main harvest season because of their inability to pay. To address the issue of health financing 
mechanisms – user fees – some countries like Malawi and Zambia waived user fees for the poor. 
Malawi initiated an Essential Health Package (EHP) in 2004 to deal with common causes of 
morbidity and mortality that disproportionately have an effect on the poor. Zambia abolished 
user fees in health for rural households in 2006. Waving user fees was seen as an efficient tool 
for bridging the socio-economic divide and improving health equity (Sambo 2012, ii).  
                                                 
1
  In 1978 two United Nations organizations, the World Health Organization and UNICEF, held a joint 
conference at Alma Ata in the Soviet Union at which health was described as a human right to which all 
people were entitled (Baum Fran, 2007:34).  
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However, the abolition of user fees was considered by some actors in the international 
community as an ineffective solution. They proposed that health insurance mechanisms would 
close health financing gaps and benefit poor people.   
 
Health insurance encompasses risk-sharing. It is supposed to reduce unforeseeable or even 
unaffordable health care costs (in the case of illness) to calculable, regularly paid premiums. But 
in Africa, public and private health insurance cover almost exclusively the formal sector, and 
therefore achieve a coverage rate of no more than 10 percent of the population. The majority of 
African citizens – informal sector workers and the rural population – don’t have access to this 
kind of social protection (World Bank 1994).  
 
As a response to the lack of social security, the negative side-effects of user fees and the 
persistent problems with health care financing, various types of community financing, especially 
for urban and rural self-employed and informal sector workers, have been recently proposed as a 
way forward (WHO 2001).  
 
Community financing is defined in Dror and Preker (2002, 2) as “a generic expression used to 
cover a large variety of health-financing arrangements . . . micro-insurance, community health 
funds, mutual health organizations, rural health insurance, revolving drug funds, and community 
involvement in user-fee management” (Ekman 2004, 1). 
  
Björn Ekman argues that there is strong evidence that community-based health insurance 
provides some financial protection by reducing out-of-pocket spending. There is also evidence of 
moderate strength that such schemes improve cost-recovery. However, there is weak or no 
evidence that schemes have an effect on the quality of care or the efficiency in which care is 
produced (Ibid). 
 
According to the World Bank, a number of Community Based Health Insurance Schemes 
(CBHIs) are growing rapidly; however, they caution that many schemes do fail (Tabor 2005, 5).  
John Ataguba argues that " Many African countries, including Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya, 
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Uganda, and Cameroon have community-based health insurance schemes that offer protection 
for the poor but are unsustainable because poor people can't contribute enough premiums to 
maintain the schemes," (Appiah 2012,1).  
 
Only Rwanda and Ghana appear to have made significant progress toward providing universal 
health coverage through a national health insurance scheme for the majority of their citizens 
(Ibid.). 
 Accordingly, this study has been formulated to analyze the problems related to the 
implementation of CBHIs and to offer possible strategies to overcome those problems.  The 
study also draws lessons from the success stories from Rwanda, a country which has successfully 
implemented the CBHIs at the national level  
I.1.2 Background of Community Based Health Insurance in Rwanda 
 
In Rwanda, the culture of community-based health insurance systems can be traced back to the 
1960s when  associations like Muvandimwe2 de Kibungo (1966) and Umubano mubantu3 de 
Butare (1975) were established.  However, these community-based health insurance initiatives 
were further developed with the reintroduction of the payment policy in 1996 (Ministry of Health 
2004, 4).   
In the Pre-Genocide period, the Rwandan vision for health care was supported by the Bamako 
Initiative4 of 1988. This initiative, adopted by many Sub-Saharan nations, aimed at revitalizing 
                                                 
2
 Muvandimwe  means “ A sibling”. So, this association was named like that because its members considered themselves like 
siblings aiming at helping each other. 
3
 “Umubano mubantu means “The good relationship among people. Those associations were initiatives of people who wanted to 
come together in order to cope with the out of pocket health expenditure. . 
4
 "The Bamako Initiative is a joint World Health Organization/ United National Children's Fund (WHO/UNICEF) Initiative 
aimed at solving the problems in the financing of primary health care in sub-Saharan Africa. It was launched in September 1987 
at a regional WHO meeting, where Mr Grant, director of UNICEF, dealt with the severe economic crises facing sub-Saharan 
Africa, the negative effects of adjustment programmes on health, and the reluctance of donors to continue to fund recurrent costs 
of primary health care programmes.  The Bamako Initiative was then taken as a means of increasing access to essential drugs 
through community participation in revolving drug funds . ).  By late 1994, the BI was implemented in 33 countries, 28 of which 
were in Sub-Saharan Africa, five were in Peru, Vietnam, Yemen, Cambodia and Myanmar.( Jakab & Krishnan 2013,21) 
 
. 
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health care strategies and strengthening equity in access to health care via decentralization to the 
local levels (Kayonga 2007, 1).  
Following the Bamako Initiative, Rwanda decentralized the management and district-level care 
strategy with the development of provincial-level health offices for health system management. 
 Although progress was made towards decentralizing management to the province-level, and 
even furtherto the district-level, this progress was disrupted by the 1994 genocide against the 
Tutsi (Ibid). As a consequence, Rwanda became an impoverished country with a largely 
destroyed health infrastructure dependent on international assistance for the provision of health 
services.  
With the advent of peace, the government began rebuilding the health system with focus on 
decentralizing management, building infrastructure, and strengthening communities’ role in 
managing and co-financing health-care. In an attempt to increase utilization rates, the 
government abolished user fees between 1994 and 1996, making health care free to all.  
However, this system lacked accountability mechanisms. It creates weak incentives for service 
providers to reach rural and poor populations; it was also under-resourced and poorly managed 
system which negatively affected quality and availability of healthcare (ibid) 
To address that situation, the government re-instituted user-fees in 1996 to supplement the 
budget and improve the system. This led to a fast drop in utilization of health care services and to 
increasingly deteriorating health outcomes. By 1999 health care utilization had dropped to  0.2 
consultations per person per year  from a national average of 0.2 in 1997 , well below the WHO 
recommendation of 1 health consultation per person per year, and fewer than 10% of the 
population had health insurance (Schneider and Diop 2001, iii). This sharp drop in health service 
use, combined with growing concerns about rising poverty, poor health outcome indicators, and 
a worrisome HIV prevalence among all population groups, motivated the Rwandan government 
to develop a Community-Based Health Insurance (CBHI) system. This CBHI, known as 
“Mutuelles de sante” was an attempt to increase the use of healthcare services especially for poor 
people from the informal sector, expand health coverage, improve resource mobilization, 
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improve community participation, and strengthen management capacities of health services 
(ibid). 
In 1999 the Rwandan government through its Ministry of health, in partnership with the local 
population, initiated 54 CBHI pilot programs, which were implemented in 3 districts:  Kabutare, 
Kabgayi and Byumba. After the pilot program, the CBHIs were scaled up to the whole country; 
they are now operating in all 30 districts that make up Rwanda (Sebatware 2011, 17).   
Organization and management of CBHI in Rwanda 
Community based health insurance schemes in Rwanda, commonly called “Mutuelles de santé”, 
function in conjunction with the small number of private insurance companies in Rwanda, as 
well as two other government and employer based insurance programs known as Rwanda Health 
Insurance Scheme (La Rwandaise d’Assurance Maladie or RAMA) and Military Medical 
Insurance (MMI). RAMA is a health insurance scheme for public servants and individuals 
working in the formal sector and their dependents. The premium under this scheme is shared by 
both the employer and the employee.  MMI provides health insurance for members of the 
Rwanda Defense Force and their dependents while private health insurance covers mainly self-
employed and private company employees (MoH 2010, 5). Mutuelles de santé insure people 
from the informal sector, who are not insured by any other insurance. These are autonomous 
establishments that are managed by their members. The regulations and rules governing the 
schemes program and its functioning are adopted by insured members. 
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The following organizational structure demonstrates how “Mutuelles de santé” is highly 
decentralized (see Figure 1), relying on existing community-based health structures at the district 
and local levels to provide a majority of management and administration of services, with only 
top-level policy and administration coordinated by the central government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: New Structure of Rwanda Health Insurance System 
Source: Ministry of Health (2010, 15). 
According to the Ministry of Health policy, CBHI are coordinated at the district level, where 
each of the 30 districts of Rwanda hosts a “Fonds de Mutuelle de Santé”. These are managed by 
a director, appointed by Order of the Minister in charge of health. At each health center at sector 
level5is a CBHI section, which includes  an implementation unit, which is managed by an 
administrator. In every village, cell and sector, there is a mobilization committee for CBHI, 
consisting of members elected by the population for a two year renewable mandate (MoH 2010, 
7). The mobilization committee is also responsible for collecting contributions and sensitizing 
the population; it also participates in the management of CBHI at sector and district levels.  
                                                 
5
  A Sector: is  A third level administrative subdivision made of many cells and then villages and  is  under District 
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At the national level, the services offered – at the reference hospitals – are paid for from the 
National Risk Pool. At the sector level, services provided –at the health centre –are financed 
though membership contributions of the population enrolled. While at the district level,  
financing is composed of funds from a variety of sources:  district, the Mutuelle sections and 
transfers from the Risk Pool and other partners. The National Risk Pool is mainly funded by the 
Government, through cross-subsidization with other insurance schemes. 
 
Furthermore, contributions are made on an annual basis and have to be made three months 
before. This avoids self-selection problems, especially for sick persons. This system takes into 
account the low purchasing power of the great majority of the Rwandan population through 
subsidies provided by the government and development partners.  
 
It should be noted that whenever an enrolled member obtains health services, he or she pays 10% 
(ticket modérateur) of medical care costs. This is meant to control for moral hazards, which may 
arise due to overusing of health services (Ibid, 6-7).   In addition, for any household to be entitled 
to benefits, all household members have to fully pay their premiums. 
 
Although, community based health insurance is voluntary, the current law on community based 
health insurance specifies that every person who resides in Rwanda, who is not insured under 
any other health insurance schemes, must join community based health insurance schemes6.  
At the beginning –during the pilot phase –the annual premium fees for enrolment was fixed to 
RWF 2, 500 (almost US $ 4) per family (Sebatware 2010, 16-17). In case of sickness people 
should visit the nearest public, or church-owned- health centers for treatment.  
After realizing success in the pilot CBHI in improving access to health services and preventing 
financial risks, these schemes have become very popular such that community and political 
                                                 
6
 See Law N° 62/2007 of 30/12/2007, related to the establishment, organization, functioning and management of 
community based health insurance. Available at http://www.cbhirwanda.org.rw/documents/Mutuelle%20Law.pdf 
(accessed on 27 January 2013 ). 
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authorities tried to scale them up at national level. In 2007, the annual subscription was then 
raised to RWF 1000 (around US $ 1.8) 7 per person per household per year. This increase was 
made so as to raise internal resource mobilisation for sustainability of community based health 
insurance and to improve health services provision and expanding basic package of curative 
services (Sebatware 2010, 17).   
Various studies have demonstrated that a contribution system based on the relative revenues of 
their members will increase equity and strengthen the financing of the CBHI System in Rwanda. 
At the same time, a contribution system raises domestic resources and reduces dependence on 
external financing. Besides ensuring financial sustainability, the premiums extend members’ 
medical service access to all hospitals, including private hospital and pharmacies and enlarge the 
package for Universal coverage (Ibid, 19).  
 
Consequently, it been decided that a  system of stratification by dividing members into 3 
categories based on Ubudehe8 criteria should be introduced. The lowest contribution group will 
comprise the first and second Ubudehe category. The middle contribution group will consist of 
the third and fourth Ubudehe category, and the highest contribution group will consist of the fifth 
and sixth Ubudehe category (MOH 2010, 11). For CBHI contribution group 1, an annual 
premium of RWF 2,000 will be paid. As this group is comprised of the most vulnerable and 
poor, it is envisaged that their contributions will be paid by a third party, either the Government 
or development partners. Contribution group 2 will be expected to pay RWF 3,000 per person; 
and group 3 will pay RWF 7,000 per person (Ibid). 
It should also be noted that all those changes in premiums took place because Rwanda wanted to 
shelve its old policy of voluntary participation and flat rate premiums, in favor of a new 
compulsory community-based insurance scheme in which premiums paid by citizens will be 
stratified and more directly based upon ability to pay. According to Rwanda’s minister of health 
Dr. Agnes Binagwaho, “The voluntary, flat-rate scheme was never meant to be permanent.” 
                                                 
7
  The exchange rate (RWF) in 2007 was  1  $ US  = RWF 555.50 
8
 Ubudehe is a community-based targeting mechanism that categorizes the Rwandan population according to their 
revenues and vulnerability 
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Rather, it was adopted for simplicity’s sake when the government first introduced the concepts of 
health insurance and prepayments in 1996 (Vogel 2011, 1).  Binagwaho added that, “What 
people were paying and will be paying is still far lower than what they’re using. It’s not fair for 
government to give subsidies at the same time for those who can pay and those who cannot pay. 
We are going to put the system in danger.” (ibid, 1)  
As Rwandans are now familiar with the concept of prepayment for health care, the country must 
regularly adjust premium levels to keep the system financially sustainable. This is emphasized by 
the minister of health when she argued that the government will still have the same 
responsibilities for people living in extreme poverty and will continue to subsidize their 
premiums through block grants to administrative districts (Ibid, 2).  
I.2 RESEARCH FOCUS AND QUESTIONS 
 
Given the limited time allocated to this study, I am unable to explore CBHIs in all developing 
countries. The main focus will be given to the case of Rwanda; however, the research will be 
compared to findings from other countries of the developing world, where necessary.  
The study focuses on the CBHIs in Rwanda for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the 
country has scaled up coverage of CBHIs from just around 35% in 2006 to almost 85% in 2008. 
Such rapid growth and coverage is unprecedented in the history of CBHIs (Mladovsky and 
Mossialos, 2006). Secondly, CBHIs in Rwanda have been accorded a central place by policy 
makers; this means they are integral in the country’s health program. That signifies that they 
have strong administrative and political support for expansion and functioning. Third, the 
experiment has attracted so much interest to the extent that other countries are considering the 
Rwandan model as an alternative vehicle for health sector financing and delivery of basic health 
services (Shimeles 2010, 6).  
These reasons led me to choose Rwanda as my case study, in order to draw lessons from its 
success so that it potentially serves as model for other developing countries.  
The research questions are formulated as follows:  
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What are the known problems in implementing community-based health insurance policies in 
developing countries?   
Why do many developing countries fail to implement CBHIs?  
Which strategies help to overcome implementation problems?  
What are the lessons from Rwanda’s case? 
The research is divided into three main parts. Part one provides the introduction and methods 
used to carry out this work. The second part reviews key concepts and theoretical frameworks, 
while the third section discusses the findings and then draws conclusions. 
I. 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
I.3.1 Literature review 
 
This study is purely qualitative research since it is focusing on meanings rather than measuring 
quantifiable phenomena (Chambliss and Schutt 2010, 196-197). This study is based on an 
extensive review of literature in scientific research articles, books and reports from World Bank, 
UNDP , WHO and national government policy & reports on implementation of CBHIs in 
developing countries.  
Reviewing and interpreting literature within the social sciences, the study is, in my opinion, 
within the hermeneutical approach. In this respect, the thesis will not be founded on brute facts, 
but on readings of meaning, which again are influenced by both the writer’s and the researcher’s  
self interpretation, our previous experiences, knowledge, readings, culture, values and other 
references in our lives (Martin & McIntyre, 1994). 
The selected literature for the thesis is directly related to the research question and the topic of 
the thesis and the findings have foundation in the literature. To further ensure a reliable and valid 
research, searching and selecting literature is being done systematically. The following search 
engines are used: Bibsys, Google Scholar, Pub Med and Academic Search Premier.  
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3. 2 Interviews 
 
Apart from literature review, qualitative interviews will be conducted in order to get 
supplementary information not found in the literature review.  
The qualitative research interview seeks to describe and to understand the meanings of central 
themes in the life world of the subjects. There exist two forms of qualitative interviews: 
individual interviews, also called in depth-interview where one individual is being interviewed 
by the researcher; and the focus group method, which is a form of interview with several people 
at the same time (Bryman 2004, 318).  In focus group interview, the researcher actively 
encourages discussion among participants on the topics of interest. In the case of this study, I 
will conduct both individual interviews and focus group. However given the limited financial 
means and time frame available, individual interviews will be limited to the managers of CBHI 
schemes and focus group will be held with beneficiaries in 2 health facilities. The results from 
interviews will help me to understand the real problems encountered by the users of CBHIs in 
Rwanda and to know what are the solutions or strategies to solve those problems.  
PART II: KEY CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
II.1 KEY CONCEPTS 
 
This section explains first what a CBHI is and then discusses about other relevant concepts that 
are related to CBHIs such as social protection, good governance, poverty and culture.   
II.1.1 What is Community-based health insurance  
 
CBHIs are called by many different names, including: micro-insurance, community health 
finance organizations, mutual health insurance schemes, pre-payment insurance organizations, 
voluntary informal sector health insurance, mutual health organizations/ associations, community 
health finance organizations, and community self-financing health organizations (Tabor 2005, 
13). There is little to distinguish one from another, except that some terms are more commonly 
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used in one part of the world than another. For example, in the anglophone literature, the terms 
Community Health Insurance and Community-Based Health Insurance are used most frequently. 
Less common is the descriptor Mutual Health Organisation, although its French equivalent 
Mutuelle de Santé is widely employed in francophone Africa, thereby emphasizing an underlying 
social dynamic (Soors Werner et al. 2010, 17). 
 
In fact, community-based health insurance (CBHI) is a not-for-profit mechanism based upon 
solidarity among a relatively small group of people. CBHI schemes vary a great deal in terms of 
who they cover, how, for what, and at what cost. The majority of CBHI schemes operate in rural 
areas, and their members are relatively poor. The best-known examples are the schemes in Africa 
known as mutuelles de santé (Joint NGO 2008, 10). They are deemed  as “local initiative which 
is built on traditional coping mechanisms to provide small scale health insurance products 
specially designed to meet the needs of low-income households ’’ (Carrin et al as cited in 
Mugisha and Mugumya 2010, 181).   
CBHI is also considered as  any program managed and operated by a community-based 
organization, other than government or a private for-profit company, that provides risk-pooling 
to cover the costs (or some part thereof) of health care services. Beneficiaries are associated 
with, or involved in the management of community-based schemes, at least in the choice of the 
health services it covers. It is voluntary in nature, formed on the basis of an ethnic of mutual aid, 
and covers a variety of benefit packages. CBHIs can be initiated by health facilities, NGOs, trade 
unions, local communities, local governments or cooperatives and can be owned and run by any 
of these organizations (Jutting in Tabor 2005, 13) 
Schemes laid out by government within a roadmap towards universal coverage might maintain 
the principle of voluntary affiliation (in rural China) or make a deliberate choice for mandatory 
affiliation like in Ghana and Rwanda (Soors Werner et al. 2010, 16). 
 
To sum up, the term community-based health insurance is used in this study to refer to any non-
profit health financing scheme, which aims primarily at the informal sector and formed on the 
basis of an ethic of mutual aid and the collective pooling of health risks, and in which the 
members participate in its management. 
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II.1.2 CBHIs as social protection and social risk management instrument 
 
Social protection is broadly and traditionally defined as “public interventions to assist 
individuals, households and communities better manage risk and provide support to the critically 
poor” (Holzmann and Jørgensen 2001, 530).  
However, the application of social risk management extends social protection as traditionally 
defined since it goes beyond public provision of risk management instrument and draws attention 
to informal and market-based arrangements and their effectiveness(ibid, 531).  
In fact, Social protection has emerged to expand traditional social security measures protecting 
people within the formal structures of employment, to incorporate those people, in poverty, 
operating outside of formal employment structures. According to the World Bank, the informal 
sector constitutes up to 80% of the workforce in Africa (Coleridge 2005). The majority of people 
from informal sector are not covered by any kind of social security though are more exposed to 
risk 
It should be noted that Social Risk Management (SRM) framework is based on two important 
assessments: (i) The poor are typically most exposed to diverse risks ranging from natural (such 
as earthquake and flooding) to manmade (such as war and inflation), from health (such as illness) 
to political risks (such as discrimination), and (ii) the poor have the fewest instruments to deal 
with these risks (such as access to government provided income support and market-based 
instruments like insurance) (Holzmann 2003). 
As consequences, the poor are the most vulnerable in society as shocks are likely to have the 
strongest welfare consequences for them and the high vulnerability makes them risk averse and 
thus unable or unwilling to engage in higher risk/higher return activities. Access to SRM 
instruments would allow the poor more risk-taking and thus provide them with an opportunity to 
gradually move out of poverty (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2001). 
 
The instruments of social protection are varied and broadly fall into the categories of social 
insurance and social assistance. Thus, CBHI is one of the instruments used to protect people, 
especially the poor from informal sector, against health risks. 
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There are a number of ways in which the Government can assist in the management of health 
risks of the poor. This includes, for example, improved provision and targeting of publicly 
provided health services to the poor; financing the inclusion of the poor in social or private 
insurance schemes; and by investing in programs that are complementary to improve health 
standards, such as clean drinking water, sanitation, and good nutrition, in poor regions. 
There are also ways in which low income communities can improve the management of health 
care risks, in partnership with Central Government and other sources of care.  
 
Those ways range from informal/individual to formal ones. In the range of informal/individual 
ways, households have many ways of avoiding, mitigating and coping with the financial 
consequences of health risks. This includes private savings, reciprocal lending, asset 
accumulation/sales, and changes in labor allocation, reduced consumption, and participation in a 
variety of formal and informal savings or mutual benefit groups. Informal insurance 
mechanisms, which involve reciprocal exchange through local groups, work reasonably well for 
some risks. Nevertheless, all of these coping mechanisms may prove insufficient to meet health 
costs, particularly if hospitalization is involved and illness is prolonged. (Preker et. al. 2001) 
 
Concerning community based health insurance systems; it differs from those informal insurance 
or other traditional forms of reciprocal exchange. It offers ex-ante, well-defined protection with a 
more reliable premium, compared to traditional insurance, in which the transfers are made ex-
post and the transfer amount unknown. Informal arrangements generally cover a variety of life-
cycle, income and health risks, while CBHI is limited to defined health risks (Tabor 2005, 14). 
Thus, CBHI is deemed to be a better tool to deal with health risks for the poor than  using coping  
mechanisms.  
II.1.3 CBHIs and good governance 
 
CBHI schemes are only able to develop because of strong political stewardship and the 
development of appropriate legislative frameworks, another condition not yet satisfied in many 
poor countries.  
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Several developing countries, however, have opted to introduce specific regulations with the aim 
of scaling up CBHI as part of their national health systems (Joint NGO 2008, 12). 
For example in Rwanda, the Government has shown stewardship by stimulating improved 
democratic governance in the health sector; the CBHIs are therefore invited to engage in 
transparent and participatory decision-making. Every scheme has now a general assembly, where 
members are able to interact with the scheme’s administrative council about needs, concerns, 
suggestions for improvements etc. This interaction with the local communities also appeared to 
have a constructive effect upon discussions and decisions concerning health at the district level  
 
According to Carrin, the Government plays four tasks: that of adviser on the design of CBHIs, 
monitor of CBHI-related activities, trainer and that of co-financier. Talking about the design of 
CBHIs, Government should be seen to steer CBHIs in the direction of a national system of 
universal coverage and financial protection. Here the Government intervenes in design CBHI 
policy in a way that prevents the problem of adverse selection by recommending not enrolling on 
individual basis but rather on a family basis (Carrin 2003, 26).  To be sustainable, CBHIs depend 
on a larger risk pools because the small schemes do not constitute a solid risk pool capable of 
insuring its members adequately. Thus the Government has the task to scale up the CBHI at 
national level in order to avoid the problem of small risk pooling. The government has also to 
make sure that the package offered by CBHI reflects the health care needs of the population  
 
Next to the tasks of adviser on the design of CBHI, Government can offer to monitor the basic 
performance of each CBHIs, track progress across the different schemes through time, and 
perform comparative analysis. Monitoring should not be understood as passive, but enables 
Government to stimulate the establishment of CBHIs, to signal problems to existing CBHIs and 
to offer practical advice concerning these problems. (ibid, 27) 
 
The results from monitoring and the promotion activities also provide a natural input into 
training activities that Government could organize. The scope of these training activities can 
cover the entire range of issues that concern the establishment and adjustment of health 
insurance, i.e. determination of the benefit package and of the contributions, collection of the 
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contributions, issues of delay in payment of contributions and non-compliance, management 
information systems and the establishment of health insurance development plans (ibid.)  
 
 Concerning the co-financing task, Government can play a substantial role in enabling 
membership of the low-income groups in CHIs. First, at the level of a CBHIs itself, Government 
could subsidize, partially or fully, the contributions of the poorest. These subsidies would be 
financed out of general taxation revenues. Government could also come to an agreement with 
donors, however, allowing them to reallocate part of their funds as subsidies (ibid.) 
II.1.4 Poverty and CBHIs 
 
 CBHIs often target people from informal sector and who are, in most of time, poorest category 
of the rest of the community or nation.  This section will explore the link between poverty and 
the success of CBHIs especially when it comes to the payment of premiums.  Before exploring 
that implication, it is deemed necessary to define what is poverty? 
 
Poverty can be defined in terms of material deprivation in terms of income as well as lack of 
access to resources, services and basic information (Ducados 2006). Further dimensions can be 
added such as ‘’exclusion from social support networks’’ (Norton et al 2001, 48); a ‘’state of 
relative powerlessness’’ (Oxfam in Green 2008, 27); and a lack of opportunities and choices 
(UNDP in Bush 2007). Poverty can be absolute where survival and subsistence is paramount, but 
relative poverty, as depicted by Townsend in 1979, is in relation to societal norms and whether 
people can do ‘’what is socially expected of them’’ (Alcock 1997, 85). 
 
In fact, widespread absolute poverty among potential members can be a serious obstacle to the 
implementation of insurance. If people are struggling for survival every day, they are less willing 
to pay insurance premiums in advance in order to use services at a later point in time. A positive 
impact of health insurance on equity and access must be doubted if a large proportion of the 
population cannot even afford CBHI membership (Wiesmann and Jütting 2000, 15). 
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Social exclusion may persist even if barriers to access are reduced for part of the population, and 
exemption mechanisms for the poorest or sliding scales for premiums that might be a remedy are 
not easy to implement. 
 
 In Developing countries because of the big number of the poor, the governments are not able to 
assist all people in need that is why they use targeting methods to select most needy people.  
In Rwanda those who cannot afford CBHI premiums are identified using community targeting. 
Targeting is a complex process which involves defining eligibility criteria. Mechanisms for 
targeting include geographic criteria, specifying categories, means tests, proxy means tests, 
community selection and self selection, or a combination thereof (Ellis et al. 2009).  
The community targeting system, used in Rwanda, identifies and ranks households according to 
6 different poverty levels using proxy indicators such as a lack of earners in the household; a 
disabled person in the household; the number of dependants; and land access (Crookes, 36). The 
range is from destitute (no land, livestock, shelter, begging to survive), to food and money rich 
(Republic of Rwanda 2009). 
 
Implicit within targeting is separating out a particular group of people which can have an 
unintended negative impact. It can contribute to divisiveness by making differences more visible 
and cause further marginalization, discrimination and stigma (Ellis et al. 2009). 
A person risks becoming socialized into a ‘’dependent disabled identity’’ (Barnes and Mercer 
2010: 114) if continually so labeled and segregated. Titmuss’ argument for universal protection 
is to avoid a sense of inferiority and stigma of the have nots, with the haves (Fitzpatrick 2001). It 
can also detract from relationships with other groups within the community who can be a source 
of exclusion (Green 2002). 
In Rwanda, during that processes of targeting the poor to be supported “there are people who 
didn’t want to be seen as the poorest of the poor, so they wanted to be placed in the middle strata 
even though they couldn’t afford the associated premiums,” Binagwaho, the Ministry of Health, 
argued (Vogel 2011, 1). However, “there was a village where everybody ranked themselves 
among the poorest of the poor, just to pay less.” (Ibid)  
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Another example is from Ghana, where CBHIs are also implemented on nationwide level. The 
premiums for nongovernment workers “were supposed to be based on income levels, but 
currently each district charges a flat premium because of the difficulty of grouping people in 
various income levels for the different premiums,” . They opted for flate premium system 
because identifying the poor is a challenge “some religious people don’t want to be labeled as 
poor” (ibid).  The mentioned examples prove that it’s a shame to be labeled as poor even when 
there are associated advantages.  
II.1.5 Cultural factors 
 
Although no single definition of culture is universally accepted by social scientists, there is 
general agreement that culture is learned, shared, and transmitted from one generation to the 
next, and it can be seen in a group’s values, norms, practices, systems of meaning, ways of life, 
and other social regularities (Kreuter et al. 2003, 133). Factors such as familial roles, 
communication patterns, beliefs relating to personal control, individualism, collectivism, and 
spirituality and other individual, behavioral, and social characteristics are not inherently 
“cultural” but may help define culture for a given group if they have special meaning, value, 
identity, or symbolism to the group’s members. In such a group, these and other factors may be 
directly or indirectly associated with health-related behaviors and/or with acceptance and 
adoption of health promotion programs (ibid, 133-134)  
 
For example in the case of health insurance, the demand of households depends not only on the 
quality of care offered by the health care provider, on the premium and benefit package, but also 
on socio-economic (as demonstrated in previous section) and cultural characteristics of 
households and communities.  
 
Cultural habits in dealing with the risk of illness can influence the demand for insurance: for 
example, in rural Benin, people were used to put money aside for unpredictable events like 
marriages and funerals, but they believed that saving money for eventual health care costs meant 
“wishing oneself the disease” (Wiesmann and Jütting 2000, 15).  Fortunately, this attitude 
changed after a CBHI had come into existence.  Another example to illustrate how social cultural 
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factors pose a barrier to demand for insurance refers to some societies where people believe that 
to think about the consequences of one’s ill-health or death is to wish oneself the same. 
Similarly, in some societies people interpret ill-health as the wish of gods or links it to one’s fate 
and hence refuse any medical treatment and turn to religious head (ibid). 
 
However, despite the negative impact of culture on the demand of health insurance, there is also 
a positive side when the culture of a given society encourages people to help each other when it 
comes to management of health risks. A society with a strong solidarity, people will not worry so 
much if the benefits of the premiums they paid will accrue to themselves or other community 
members. For example, members of the Bwamanda scheme in Ex-Zaire expressed the opinion 
that if they would not need health care themselves, at least they had done something good for the 
community by contributing to the insurance fund (Criel, 1998). The level of solidarity and 
mutual trust is probably higher in homogeneous, close-knit communities than in scattered and 
diverse populations comprising people of different ethnic origin, religion and culture (Creese and 
Bennett 1997). Existing, “traditional” institutions of risk-sharing and mutual help can on the one 
hand facilitate CBHI implementation, because health insurance may be built upon these groups, 
as has been done with the Engozi societies in Uganda by the Kisiizi Hospital Health Society 
(Musau 1999).  
 
On the other hand, the different logic of traditional networks sometimes induces misperceptions 
of insurance and disappointment, because people have expectations based on their experience 
with traditional institutions that are not fulfilled by CBHI, e.g. that the money paid into the 
common fund accumulates over time and that the benefits will correspond to the contributions 
made (Batusa 1999). A lot of community sensitization and mobilization may be necessary in this 
respect. In any case, initiators and managers of health insurance schemes should pay more 
attention to consumer satisfaction and to people’s preferences and perceptions, because these are 
crucial factors for successful implementation of CBHI.  
 
 
20 
 
II.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
This section explores two theories that are, in one way or another, relevant to the success of 
CBHIs. The first one is social capital theory and the second one is about social mobilization 
theory.  
II.2. 1 Social capital theory 
 
Putnam (1993), the first scholar to popularize social capital theory, argues that social capital 
consists of “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1993, 2). He asserts that 
informal networks of civic engagement build social capital which in turn facilitates improved 
governance (ibid, 3).  
Michael Woolcock takes the theory a bit farther by breaking social capital into four categories: 
(i) bonding social capital inhering in micro level intra-community ties; (ii) bridging social capital 
inhering in micro level extra-community networks; (iii) bridging social capital inhering in 
relations between communities and macro-level state institutions; and (iv) bonding social capital 
inhering in macro level social relations within public institutions (Maldovsky and Mossialos 
2006, 6). 
 
According to Woolcock and Narayan (2000, 229) social capital helps the poor to manage risk 
and vulnerability. Thus, CBHI which aims at managing risk and vulnerability may be well 
accepted by a community that possesses a high stock of social capital.  A high level of social 
capital is associated with a high level of altruism among individuals; this makes it possible to 
take into consideration the well-being of other members of the group. The presence of social 
capital always has a positive effect on a community’s welfare. (Ibid) 
Fukuyama (1995, 4) asserted that “social capital can be defined simply as the existence of a 
certain set of informal values or norms shared among the members of a group that permit 
cooperation among them”. Sobel (2002) describes social capital as circumstances in which 
individuals can benefit from group membership. Thus, social capital refers to social life-
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networks, norms, and trust that enables households to act together more effectively to pursue 
shared objectives. This social capital in the community can be an asset for the breakthrough of 
CBHI, thus contributing to the demand for CBHI at the community level.  
 
 In this study I will apply the Woolcock’s framework of social capital to CBHI literature because 
it brings together several theories of social capital and draws on quantitative and qualitative 
evidence from field studies.  
 
Perception of CBHI through the lens of the social capital framework 
 
Several studies have demonstrated that a high social capital in the community increases the 
chance for the community-based health insurance to be successful (Woolcock and Narayan 
2000). 
The first level of social capital framework according to Woolcock which refers to micro level 
bonding social capital proves that schemes characterized by strong intra-community ties are 
more likely to experience success in CBHI than those without these ties. According to Woolcock 
and Narayan (ibid, 230) “strong ties” refers to the close relationship between an individual and 
his family, friends, ethnic group, etc. This corresponds to intra-community social capital. “Weak 
ties” refers to the individual’s contacts outside the ethnic group or the family (other 
entrepreneurs, other ethnic groups, banks, etc.). This corresponds to extra-community social 
capital. In other words, “strong ties” refers to the interactions that exist within a particular group 
(closed family, friends), whereas “weak ties” refers to the interactions across multiple groups 
(open groups or networks) (ibid).   
To demonstrate that, in his study, Hsiao (2001, 5) considers two communities. Community A has 
less social capital than community B. Thus, community B will have the greater potential of the 
establishment and success of CBHI than community A. He further concludes that community A 
will not be able to establish CBHI since there is a low level of social capital in that community.   
Thus, there is argument that strong ties have a positive effect on CBHI by constraining adverse 
selection and moral hazard and increasing willingness to pay. There are also ideas that trust and 
solidarity bonds in the community improve the likelihood of success in CBHI.  
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Recently, Zhang et al. (2006, 233) explored the effect of social capital on the demand for CBHI 
subsidized by the Chinese government. The Government aimed at encouraging Chinese farmers 
in villages to join CBHI companies by subsidizing the annual allowance of each participant by 
10-20 Yuan (1.25-2.50 US $). Trust and reciprocity were used as proxies of social capital to 
obtain the effect of social capital on the demand (five questions on trust and five others on 
reciprocity). Using logistic regression, the results of such a study demonstrate that social capital 
measured by trust and reciprocity has a positive and significant effect on the demand for CBHI.   
 
 However, there is another argument that strong intra-group bonds actually prevent the 
emergence of successful CBHI (Meessen, 2002). Similitude between members is a flaw for 
CBHI. For example if all members undertake risky behavior, CBHI might not work properly.  
 
There are therefore two countervailing (positive and negative) views of the effect of bonding 
social capital on CBHI in the literature (Maldovsky and Mossialos 2006, 13). However, the 
social capital framework provides an alternative, third hypothesis: communities with both strong 
intra-community ties (promoting solidarity) and extra-community networks (promoting a 
willingness to invest in and draw on a larger, more generalized and formal pool of resources) are 
probably more likely to experience greater success with CBHI than communities with one or 
neither types of social capital 
 
Second level of Woolcock framework of social capital discusses about bridging social capital. 
Here the tasks is to demonstrate the effect of vertical and horizontal civil society links on CBHI 
According to Preker, horizontal civil society links facilitate the enlargement of the risk pool. 
In the context of CBHI, enlarging the risk pool has been interpreted as a case of constructing 
bridging social capital (Preker et al., 2002). Establishing and strengthening links with formal 
financing networks is cited as an example. In Rwanda federations of smaller CBHI schemes pool 
part of their funds at the district level to cover care in district hospitals (Schneider, 2001). 
Creating horizontal links through scheme mergers in this way allows schemes to expand the risk 
pool while continuing to capitalize on the positive social bonds fostered by small risk groups 
(Davies and Carrin, 2001). Larger pools are required in order to: spread risk; actuarially correctly 
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assess the probability of the loss occurring and therefore maintain solvency; cross-subsidize and 
lower transaction costs (Schieber, 1997) 
 
 While horizontal links facilitates the enlargement of the risk pool, the vertical linkages play a 
great role in capacity building. Vertical linkages, in the form of support from overseas agencies, 
are employed by CBHI schemes to build capacity in technical areas such as financial and general 
management and in administration, since the necessary skills for implementing CBHI are often 
not available locally (Bennett, 1998). In an exploratory study comparing a successful CBHI 
scheme in the Philippines and a less successful one in Guatemala (Ron, 1999), one of the major 
success factors in the Philippines (where the scheme grew steadily over three years) may have 
been bridging social capital constructed through several types of vertical links. A very effective 
administrative structure was provided by the international NGO Organization for Education 
Resources and Training (ORT). The structure was developed through the built-in members’ 
participation mechanisms within a cooperative structure, combined with the financial and moral 
support given by the ORT country office and ultimately the World ORT Union (ibid.) 
The Guatemalan scheme, despite receiving superior technical assistance from the WHO, failed to 
progress after initial registration, partly because it did not develop supportive links with local 
social and political structures (Ibid.)  
 
The third level of Woolcock’s  framework of social capital concerns macro level bridging social 
capital: the effect of synergy on CBHI. 
There are several views on the appropriate role of the state in CBHI.  Pauly (Pauly et al., 2006) 
has recently advocated minimal government regulation of CBHI, arguing that government 
subsidy causes cream skimming and adverse selection. The health system framework suggests 
that although CBHI is a private sector method of financing health care, the government can play 
a vital role in schemes’ success, should it decide that CBHI is a good strategy to further its 
objectives.  Bennett et al (Bennett, 1998) argue that if there is government failure, or no clear 
government policy, schemes are likely to play an important role in the delivery of health care, 
but issues relating their role in the broader health system are unlikely to be relevant. If 
government is strong, they argue that CBHI relations with the government are likely to be very 
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important. The following three government mechanisms for supporting community health 
financing have been identified: stewardship (for example regulation and monitoring); creating an 
enabling environment (for example the rule of law); and resource transfer (for example 
subsidies) (Ranson, 2002).  
 
The fourth level refers to macro level bonding social capital: the effect of organizational integrity 
on CBHI. Woolcock (Woolcock, 1998) defines organizational integrity as a type of social 
capital. He draws on neo-Weberian theory in perceiving institutional coherence, competence and 
capacity as deriving from an organizational form that socialises bureaucrats. This allows 
Woolcock to view the effectiveness of organizations, particularly government, as a product of 
social relations which foster a certain set of norms. 
 
Evans (Evans, 1996) argues that without a coherent Weberian bureaucracy (characterized by 
meritocratic recruitment, good salaries, sharp sanctions against violations of organizational 
norms and solid rewards for career-long performance) state-society synergy is possible but it will 
not be a force for good and will foster corruption instead.  
To conclude, It should be noted that, though, social capital could significantly affect a 
households’ decision for health insurance, up to date, there is no clear consensus on how social 
capital should be measured. As stated by Fukuyama, (1995) “one of the greatest weaknesses of 
the social capital concept is the absence of consensus on how to measure it”. 
 
II.2. 2 Social mobilization theory  
 
Social mobilization theory has been proven as effective for health promotion especially when 
people are reluctant to respond positively to health program. In the case of CBHI, people need to 
be mobilized in order to understand and to adhere to the program given the fact that most of 
people do not see direct benefits of health insurance (time inconsistence problem).  Hence, this 
section develops social mobilization theory and shows how it leads to social and behavior change 
through effective communication.  
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Social mobilization is a multi-level, dynamic approach that can be initiated either top-down or 
bottom-up. Community is perceived in its broadest sense to include all those who have a role and 
responsibility in effecting change. As information is made available and understandable to both 
experts and lay people, broad ownership and popular support are created (Russel and Levitt-
Dayal 2003, 2). 
Social mobilization refers to “the use of planned actions and processes to reach, influence, and 
involve all stakeholders across all relevant/pertinent/involved/concerned sectors, including the 
national and the community level to raise awareness, change behavior, change policy, demand a 
particular development program, or reallocate resources or services” (Ibid, 22). 
The social mobilization approach can be used in different health issues including safe 
motherhood, community based health insurance, family planning, HIV/AIDS prevention, girls 
education and so on. 
A community based health insurance like any other health program, to be effective, needs a 
multi-pronged approach of social mobilization that encompassed communication through 
dialogue at multiple levels and among multiple audiences. It also requires broaden public support 
through community mobilization. Here Community mobilization refers to a process of problem 
identification and problem solving stimulated by a community itself or facilitated by others that 
involves local institutions, local leaders, community groups and members of the community 
(CEDPA 2000). Community mobilization uses deliberate, participatory processes to involve 
local institutions, local leaders, community groups, and members of the community to organize 
for collective action toward a common purpose. Community mobilization is characterized by 
respect for the community and its needs. (ibid) 
For social mobilization to be successful and to build this base of popular support, communication 
needs to be a process of dialogue, information sharing, mutual understanding, and collective 
action. Standardized messages are used to promote a dialogue within the community as a whole 
(Aubel 2001).  
 
It should also be noted that the CBHI to be sustainable needs mobilization for human and 
financial resources.  Neil McKee (1992) lists five main approaches to mobilizing human and 
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financial resources: (1) political mobilization, (2) government mobilization, (3) community 
mobilization, (4) corporate mobilization, and (5) beneficiary mobilization. Social mobilization 
uses community events to attract the attention of policy makers, community members, and media 
representatives and motivate them to take action on a specific issue such as immunization, 
literacy, or family planning. Social mobilization amplifies advocacy activities, strengthens 
communication, and allows many more societal partners to participate in the program. To be 
successful a CBHI program needs to use all those approaches to mobilize human and financial 
resources.  
Champions for change such as community health workers are concerned with building consensus 
and educating people to energize and empower them to take focused action. They share 
information and galvanize many stakeholders around an issue. The stakeholders then agree on a 
goal, develop key themes and messages, and exert political pressure for policy changes and 
increased recognition of a widely recognized problem. A sense of community is built around the 
issue, and more people join the movement. This bandwagon effect leads to increased resources 
and formation of new social norms, creating a climate that supports individual behavior change 
as well as social change (Russel and Levitt-Dayal 2003, 3). 
To conclude, many public health and social problems in resource-poor countries require a 
broader approach that addresses social, cultural, and environmental factors that affect individual 
behavior. Broader interventions that involve community members, stakeholders, and others at 
multiple levels are needed because these intractable problems can only be solved through 
collective action. Also, in some cultures the concept of the individual does not exist or is 
secondary to the group or community. Thus, it is important to understand how an individual’s 
behavior is shaped by his/her social context and to recognize the influence of local values and 
social norms on individual behavior  (ibid 4). 
Due to societal influences on individual behavior, communication should aim to effect broader 
social change. 
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PART III: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Although the number of CBHIs is rapidly growing, there are only a few schemes in existence in 
the developing countries today, and these provide coverage to less than a tenth of the developing 
world’s population. Many of these schemes are less than a decade old; few have been rigorously 
evaluated; and lessons of experience are still to be acquired.  
 
This finding section is made up of 3 themes. Theme one reviews the problems related to the 
implementation of CBHIs in developing countries. The second theme discusses different 
strategies adopted to overcome those problems. The third theme draws lessons learned from 
Rwanda’s experiences. A set of conclusions is presented in the fourth and final section. 
 
III.1 PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CBHIs IN  
        DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
Many problems threaten the performance of CBHIs. Some of them are related to the insurance 
risk, others are linked to the scheme design while others are related to the context in which CBHI 
is offered.  
II.1.1 Problems related to Insurance risk 
 
Several studies on community based health insurance have reported the presence of adverse 
selection and moral hazard as main challenges faced by insurance companies among of others 
CBHI.  
Adverse selection 
 
Adverse selection is one of the major threats that hinder the implementation of CBHIs since most 
of them are based on voluntary membership. Atim (1998), Criel (1998), (Carrin 2003), Preket et 
al. (2010) pointed out that voluntary membership can make these schemes vulnerable to adverse 
selection.  Adverse selection results when high-risk or sick individuals are more likely to buy 
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health insurance than the low-risk or healthy individuals (Tabor2005, 39). In the presence of 
adverse selection, the premiums which are fixed at the average risk in the population are not 
enough to cover all the claims. Hence, the financial sustainability of the scheme is jeopardized 
and the insurers increase the premium which may make the contract a bad deal for low-risks 
individuals. Consequently low-risk individuals would opt out of the scheme as the membership 
in the scheme is made voluntary.  As this mechanism of adverse selection escalates, the 
premiums continue to increase and fewer people will be able to afford to pay the premium (Barr 
1992, 779-780).  
 
In fact, adverse selection has been studied extensively in the context of high-income countries. 
Most of the research is focused on employer or government insurance schemes. There are 
relatively fewer studies from low and middle income countries where adverse selection in CBHI 
schemes is analyzed in detail. Thus, the evidence is still mixed. Wang et al. (2006) found the 
presence of adverse selection in the Rural Mutual Health Care in China. Criel studied the 
prepayment scheme for Masisi Health District scheme in the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
found adverse selection among pregnant women. At the initial stage of this scheme, he found 
that subscription took place on an individual basis, and the insurance option was preferentially 
chosen by pregnant women. After the household had been fixed as unit of membership in the 
second year, the proportion of pregnancy related health problems among hospital admissions 
dropped (Criel 1998). In Rwanda, when the “Mutuelles de santé” system was introduced, a big 
number of subscribers were pregnant women and children under five years because they were 
members of low-healthy categories. An evaluation of the Community Health Fund in rural 
Tanzania also (cited in Musau 1999) found that 52 % of the sampled member households 
reported at least one person suffering from a chronic ailment.  
On the other hand, Dror et al. (2005) examined the Micro Health Insurance Units in Philippines 
and concluded that there was no adverse selection as the morbidities among the insured and 
uninsured was same as concluded by De Allegri et al. (2006) for the CBHI scheme in Burkina 
Faso. Resende and Zeidan  (2010) also did not find adverse selection in the Brazilian individual 
health insurance market 
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Most of these studies are based on cross-sectional data and therefore did not study whether the 
process of adverse selection changed over time.  
To combat this problem some general strategies have been adapted and are presented in the next 
section  
 
Moral hazard 
Moral hazard is another serious challenge faced by CBHIs. This problem arises because of the 
tendency by individuals to behave, once they are insured, in such a way as to increase the 
likelihood of the risk against which they have insured (Criel 1998). Moral hazard problem too 
has implication on financial sustainability of a scheme, but in addition, it also has implications 
for costs of provision of such services.  
 
Ahuja and Jütting have proved that the moral hazard problem is of two kinds: ex ante moral 
hazard and ex post moral hazard problem. The former arises due to reduced care of health after 
joining a scheme; the latter arises due to increased demand for medical care, once insured. The 
good example to illustrate post moral hazard is the over-consumption of medical services. This 
overconsumption may be the result of the provider’s behavior or due to patient’s behavior (Ahuja 
and Jütting 2003, 13).   
 
Indeed, on one hand there are many examples of insurance schemes that have quickly gone 
bankrupt because of the problem of ex-post moral hazard one the part of providers. Over 
prescription of services or drugs to CBHI members by doctors has been reported in several cases 
For instance, at the Kisiizi Hospital Health Society in Uganda, the Chogoria Hospital Scheme in 
Kenya, the Atiman Health Insurance Scheme in Tanzania (Musau 1999), and has at least been 
suspected of the Masisi Scheme in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where part of the revenue 
was used as incentive payment for doctors (Creese and Bennett 1997). In Rwanda, managers 
from different CBHIs at District Hospitals claim that major challenges they face include over-
prescription and over-charging of acts by providers, as well as  the misappropriation of funds in 
some sections of CBHI. 
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In some cases, extremely high hospital admission rates suggest the prevalence of overutilization 
by CBHI members. The insured consumers have a tendency to go for excess utilization of health 
care since they do not pay the full marginal cost of provision. 
For example, after the introduction of the Masisi scheme, the hospital admission rate among the 
insured increased dramatically, reaching 157%, five times higher than among the non-insured. In 
Murunda, Rwanda, the hospital admission rate among members of the “Mutualité du Kanage” 
was about 141% and only 6% among non-members, which means that the insured used inpatient 
hospital care 23 times more than the non-insured (Musau, 1998).  
 
The figures are partly explained by the self-selection of high-risk individuals or households, and 
by better financial access to medically justified care; unnecessary use of services seems likely.  
 
To distinguish ex-post moral hazard, presented through above examples, the ex-ante moral 
hazard refers to the possibility that preventive efforts are scaled back in response to insurance 
coverage (Zweifel & Manning, 2000). 
 
When it comes to providing health insurance to the low income people through micro-insurance, 
the argument is that ex ante moral hazard is dominant and serious rather than ex post moral 
hazard. This argument is based on the fact that the poor are the most vulnerable in society and 
shocks are likely to have the strongest welfare consequences for them; furthermore, high 
vulnerability makes them risk averse and, thus, unable or unwilling to engage in higher 
risk/higher return activities.  Once insured, the consumers –especially the poor – may reduce 
efforts required to keep them healthy. An example from Ghana helps shed light on the problem. 
Users of CBHIs declared, “We have mosquito nets but we don’t use them. If you are insured it is 
easier to go to the hospital [in case of malaria] [..] Why would you spend GH¢8 on the bed net 
while you can take GH¢2 to go to the hospital?”(Debebe 2012, 2). This attitude signals a 
potential incentive problem related to health insurance (ibid). It is important to note that ex-ante 
moral hazard is found in all kinds of insurance markets and developing countries, as well as in 
developed ones.   
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 Ahuja and Jütting affirm that ex-post moral hazard is more serious than ex-ante moral hazard  
since it is unlikely that insured individuals would deliberately increase their chances of falling 
sick just because the insurer is paying the medical expenses (Ahuja, Jütting 2003, 11-12).  
Also, Cutler & Zeckhauser point out that one reason not to consider ex-ante moral hazard as a 
serious problem is the idea that uncompensated loss of health is consequential (Cutler & 
Zeckhauser, 2000). Put differently, people are assumed not to take a gamble with their personal 
health, or that of household members.  
The ex-ante moral hazard is more likely to occur in car insurance where  the insured`s behavior 
could be indulged in more risky behavior such as being less cautious in vehicle operation, 
staging incidents to collect insurance proceeds, or exaggerating loss or injury. 
  
Lahkar and  Sundaram-Stukel  (2010, 5)  believe  that the moral hazard  problem is more 
fundamental than that of adverse selection. Their belief is based on the fact that adverse selection 
can be eliminated if accurate information about risk characteristics is available. Since CBHI 
schemes serve a local clientele, it would be fair to assume that it would have a sufficiently 
accurate level of information about the risk features of its clients. On the other hand, moral 
hazard would exist even in a world with perfect information. Hence, moral hazard is a much 
more serious problem that CBHI schemes need to grapple with.  
 
Fraud and corruption 
Apart from adverse selection and moral hazard, fraud and corruption are also among the major 
problems that hold back the implementation of CBHI schemes. Health insurance is subject to the 
risk of fraud, or deceptions intentionally practiced by patients, providers, and CBHI staff and 
managers, to secure unfair or unlawful gain (Tabor 2005, 39).  
 
McCord and Osinde argue that lack of professional management can make CBHIs vulnerable to 
fraud. In the case of Tanzania’s UMASIDA CBHI, group leaders were selected from the local 
communities. They were not professional managers, yet they had a great deal of financial 
responsibility. Several of them became frustrated with all the work involved and found 
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themselves tempted by the premiums. Hence, many of these groups experienced a change in 
leadership because of fraud (McCord and Osinde 2002).  
 
Apart from the fraud on behalf of mangers, cases of fraud on behalf of patients have been 
reported by the CBHIs managers at different health facilities in Rwanda. Normally, new 
subscribers had to wait one month before enjoying their contributions. At times, however, they 
did not want to respect that period and, as a result, wanted to corrupt CBHI managers in order to 
get treatment before the due date.  
 
Similarly, a manager of CBHI at Muhima Hospital, also in Rwanda, claimed to refuse a bribe of 
100,000 Frw  (around 153$) from a patient who wanted to pay premiums and get the medical 
treatment on the same day because he was seriously ill and couldn’t afford the hospital bill which 
would come without medical insurance. This situation is also connected to the problem of time 
consistence when people do not think about the benefit of the medical insurance before they fall 
sick.  
 
Another form of fraud comes from the patients who want to belong to the category of low 
income earners while they, in fact, earn more. They do that to avoid paying high premiums. 
However, this problem has been solved. Each section of CBHI in Rwanda has an exhaustive list 
of all Rwandans and the categories to which they belong to. When people want to pay premiums, 
the manager checks the names on the list and charges them the premiums according to their 
respective categories. In fact, people are involved in that kind of fraud because they are unhappy 
about the category to which they belong. Vincent Sinduhunga ,  in his article in New Times,  
declares that 27.3 per cent of Mutuelle de Santé users were dissatisfied with the categories in 
which they were placed (New Times, 2013).  Accordingly, the government has ordered the 
revision of those categories, to make sure that everyone is classified into the right category.  
III. 1.2 Problems related to design features 
 
Another category of problems that menace the performance of CBHIs arise from the way the 
CBHI has been developed, designed, and managed. Those problems are related to small risk 
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pool, high start-up cost, under pricing (due to lack of information to set prices), coverage, and 
weak management capacity. 
 
CBHIs tend to be small. Theoretically, no general rules on the minimum size of a CBHI can be 
given because its size depends on the nature of the insured risks. However, experience suggests 
that very small schemes are difficult to sustain. Unlike larger insurance pools, the small 
membership pool of many CBHIs limits scope for risk diversification. As a result, there is a 
threat that a small policy base will be unacceptably volatile. Small risk pools make it 
prohibitively expensive to cover rare but expensive health risks (Tabor 2005, 30).  
 
However, some other scholars argue that if the risk is extended, formal rules become necessary. 
This is because local knowledge and social sanctions grow weaker as the group grows larger. 
Then “if micro-insurance among others BHI is work well, the group must be small enough for 
local knowledge and social sanctions to operate efficiently. Barriers must be raised against 
potential bad risks, since the risk pool is too small to take in chance “(Overbye 2005, 310).  
 
On the other hand, smallness does convey important institutional advantages. Proximity enables 
social control, peer pressure, reciprocity and shared social values to be used to foster 
accountability and ensure compliance. In CBHIs where participants know about the risk profile 
of others, there is scope for peer monitoring to encourage healthy lifestyles, to minimize fraud 
and to discourage frivolous claims. In small schemes, coordination costs are lower and 
participation is easier to encourage. Moreover, the spirit of CBHI voluntarism contributes to 
social solidarity and inclusiveness.   
 
It should be noted that the CBHI tend to contribute to universal coverage when it comes to 
medical insurance. To reach this objective, it needs large risk pool to limit the scope for risk 
diversification and many are threaten by the problem of adverse selection since the membership 
is voluntary for most of CBHIs.  
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Apart from small risk pools, there is also a problem of meeting high Start-up Costs. CBHIs are 
costly to establish. They require a detailed feasibility study, dedicated staff, and creation of new 
procedures and protocols. All this must be accomplished before there are adequate premiums to 
cover administrative costs. Although participation is vital to the success of CBHIs, many are 
actually formed in a “top-down” manner. Managers, reporting to a sponsor NGO, government or 
donor agency, will have a particular CBHI insurance model in mind and will mobilize village 
leaders or branches representatives to “implement” that model (Tabor 2005, 31) 
 
Under-Pricing is another problem faced by the designers of CBHI. Many CBHI schemes have 
problems because of initially under-pricing their operations. This reduces premiums almost 
directly and leads to a vicious cycle of premium increases, reduced growth and renewals, 
increasingly slow payments to providers, service refusals and premium increases.  
 
At times, under-pricing arises because communities under-value insurance but also due to lack of 
information to set prices (Ibid, 35). This lack of information leads to CBHI to restrict benefit 
packages to services that are easier to price (i.e. regular primary care services), to cap coverage 
of hard-to-forecast health events (such as long duration hospital stays) and to negotiate payment 
terms with providers (such as payment per treatment) that are easier to predict.  
 
Coverage: The benefit package should be affordable and include basic services tailored to the 
health care needs and preferences of the population.  If the health package is not attractive to 
people, they will not buy medical insurance.  
However, to keep benefit packages simple, CBHIs normally offer one coverage package for all 
households. Since the risk profiles and risk-management capacities of households differ, one-
size-fits-all coverage is bound to be less than totally effective and efficient as a health-risk 
management device for all families. On the other hand, one of the great efficiency advantages of 
CBHIs over other forms of insurance (or public provision) is that they can draw on location-
specific information to craft benefit packages that meet the common priorities of their members.  
 
The mutual health organizations in Nigeria, for example, apply an innovative approach to 
defining the benefit package. They interview the communities to identify the ten most pressing 
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health problems, and concentrate their coverage on these, with the aim of improving community 
health as a whole (Ibid, 34). 
 
Management Capacity 
 
A weakness in management capacity is one of the most severe problems faced by the CBHIs. 
The weak CBHI management capacity includes a failure to adequately manage insurance risks, 
unrealistic premiums, the absence of a community business culture, low controls for fraud, 
limited coverage (and hence high risk of adverse selection), absence of qualified staff trained in 
insurance, lack of marketing surveys to link products to perceived needs, limited marketing 
beyond the pilot phase, poor data handling and management capacities, and stiff competition 
from highly subsidized government hospitals and national social health insurance agencies ( 
McCord and Osinde 2002, Musau 1999). 
 
In practice, many CBHIs have managers who are not well-versed in insurance, finance, or in the 
basics of business management. That is because CBHIs are managed on a voluntary basis and 
draw on existing members as elected managers.  
 
McCord argues that weak management can lead to the rapid erosion of trust. It is one of the main 
reasons given for the demise of new schemes (McCord 2002).  Banerjee and Duflo added that 
the lack of trust leads to another problem of lack of credibility on the insurance provider. 
Credibility is very crucial for the insurance provider because the insurance contract that the 
insurer enters in with the insured requires the individual who is to be insured to pay in advance. 
This means that the insured individual is required to trust the insurer completely. Hence lack of 
credibility becomes a huge problem especially when insurance companies are unable to address 
clearly the problem of fraud or when the nature of the products is unclear (Banerjee and Duflo 
2011, 153). 
 
Management information systems –manual or computerized –are also critical to the effective 
operation of a CBHI. It becomes extremely difficult to manage a program without the ability to 
track premium payments, utilization, and other costs. Integrating hands-on management controls 
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with information systems can help CBHIs cut costs and improve service. Microcare (Uganda), 
for example, uses a check-in desk of their own in their provider facilities to verify eligibility and 
track utilization. This information is fed directly into their computerized MIS system to ensure 
that only covered patients gain access to approved services, and that facilities do not over-bill for 
services (Tabor 2005, 35). 
 
III. 1. 3 Problems related to context. 
 
 According to Tabor, there are different problems related to the context in which CBHI is 
designed and implemented, such as poverty, awareness, and covariate risk (Tabor 2005, 28).  
CBHIs become successful when the context in which it has been designed, and in which it is 
being implanted, is favorable. In case that context is not good, the design and the implementation 
of the scheme are also somehow negatively affected.  
 
Severe poverty can slow down the success of a CBHI. If most people are simply struggling to 
survive, they will be less willing to pay insurance premiums in advance to use services at a latter 
point in time. In fact the poor are the most vulnerable in a society because they are the most 
exposed to the whole range of risks and at the same time they have the least access to appropriate 
risk management instruments. The poor have only recourse to coping mechanisms: they try to 
cope with the risk when it has already occurred (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2001).  
 
According to the patients from different Health centers in Rwanda, lack of money was the most 
frequent reason for non-subscribers not to join the insurance scheme.  A non-subscriber met at 
Gihogwe Health center (in Rwanda) would say, “We are not refusing to pay, but we can’t afford 
to”. The manager of that health center also confirms that since the increase of premiums, the 
number of subscribers has reduced considerably.  
 
Normally the Government of Rwanda pays premiums for the poorest people of the community. 
The person is identified in the community and classified as poorest of the poor in Ubudehe 
categories, Still, the number of people who cannot afford the premiums keeps increasing.  
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Besides money, payment modalities can also present problems. If the annual premium must be 
paid in a lump sum (instead of payments spread out over the year), households find it more 
difficult to pay.  According to Morestin & Ridde , in Burkina Faso, for instance, the households 
stressed that a single payment is more problematic in rural areas, where it is hard to obtain credit. 
Another element is the time at which the payment is due. Incomes of workers in the informal or 
agricultural sectors vary over the course of the year. In Ghana, households in Nkoranza 
complained that the premium is due at a time of year when their financial situation is poor. In 
Rwanda, the premium must be paid at the start of the civil  year, when families also have to pay 
school fees (Morestin & Ridde 2009, 2). 
 
Apart from the problems related to poverty, there is also another problem of awareness. There is 
an argument that most of the time the poor do not understand the concept of insurance very well. 
It is true that insurance is unlike most transactions that the poor are used to. It is something that 
you pay for, hoping that you will never need to make use of it (Banerjee and Dulfo 2012, 152). 
 
 Cultural norms and values also play a role. If people see disease as a punishment for evil 
behavior, they will not join a CBHI. In some parts of rural Benin, for example, saving money for 
a disease was seen to be “wishing oneself the disease” (Tabor 2005, 29). 
 
Tabor also argues that under-insurance, or the choice of an individual to buy less insurance than 
is needed or could be afforded, can occur when people don’t understand the benefits that 
insurance can bring.  Drop-out rates can be very high in cases where individuals feel that the 
benefits should correspond to the contributions they have made (i.e. savings concepts) (Ibid, 28).   
 
The problem of time inconsistence can also be related to this problem of awareness. When 
deciding whether or not to buy insurance, we need to do the thinking in the present (when we 
pay the premium), but the payout, if any, would take place in the future. Thus it is difficult to 
take a decision to buy insurance when you do not have a problem, in that time,  
one does not see the benefit of insurance (Banerjee and Dulfo 2012, 154). 
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 The Minister of Health in Rwanda also argued that to convince people to pay in advance is a 
process. That insurance was not in the culture or the mentality, let alone more complex schemes 
(Vogel 2011). Thus, cultural habits in dealing with the risk of illness can influence negatively the 
demand for insurance. 
 
Covariate Risk is another problem that CBHI’s are especially facing because of their small size 
and limited geographical focus. In practice, an individual’s health is not independent of their 
neighbors and this is especially the case where regions are prone to natural disasters or epidemics 
(Tabor 2005, 30). Holzmann and Jørgensen argue that the informal risk management instruments 
among other CBHI tend to break down when facing highly covariate or macro-type risks because 
such disastrous events reduce rapidly the financial reserves of the scheme ( Holzmann and 
Jørgensen 2001, 539).  
 
A malaria epidemic in southwestern Uganda cost the Kisiizi Hospital Health Society around 8.5 
million Ugandan shilling (about 6,500 US$). As a consequence, from January to December 1998 
no more than 64% of treatment expenditures were covered by the scheme’s revenues – without 
the epidemic the cost recovery rate would have amounted to nearly 90% (McGaugh 1999). 
Though no formal public-private partnership contract had been signed with the Ministry of 
Health, the ministry has implicitly accepted responsibility for losses due to epidemics and has 
reimbursed the associated expenses to the scheme (Musau 1999), acting as a public reinsurance 
agency (Jütting 2000, 12). 
To address all those implementation problems of CBHI, a number of strategies has been put in 
place.  
 
III.2 POSSIBLE STRATEGIES  
Given the complexity of the above presented problems, there unfortunately exists no panacea for 
conquering all of them. It is important to grasp that the context and particularity of systems 
would play an important role in determining what sort of strategy will be applicable to which 
problems. However, based on the literature reviewed and interviews, some best practices can be 
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shared here. In the first part of the discussion, possible strategies that can be used for tackling the 
problems related to  insurance risks are presented. The second part will thus be devoted to  
strategies for dealing with the problems related to design features. It is important to note however 
that some of the strategies may be appropriate for solving the problems related to contextual  
considrations such as poverty, awerness and covariate risk.  
III.2.1 Strategies to combat challenges related to insurance risks 
 
Adverse selection 
As Fitzpatrick (ed.) (2006, 750) asserts, an insurance company severely threatened by adverse 
selection and moral hazard will not be willing to provide insurance service. This will eventually 
lead the insurance market to function inefficiently. However, since adverse selection is a sort of 
‘before insurance transaction problem,’ Fitzpatrick argues that a possible method to avert it 
would be for insurers to demand a medical examination or extend the waiting period (ibid, 880). 
Such a method may in part assist the insurer to identify high-risk and low-risk groups. 
Additionally, insurers could offer different policies to the volunteer customers, such as charging 
higher premium to cover more risk and lower premium to cover limited risk and hope that 
customers will self-select themselves into appropriate premiums. This strategy however would 
not be as effective in practice as it appears in theory because a high likelihood that ‘bad risks’ 
will still not be compelled to insure for more if they deem it possible to ensure for less still 
exists.  
The ultimate solution may thus still be government involvement in mandating enrollment so as to 
limit the possibility of ‘low risks’ opting out of the system. As Barr (1992:752) asserts, making 
membership compulsory will not only prevent low-risk from opting out of the pooling 
equilibrium but will also allow for a larger risk pooling. This compulsory enrollment imposed in 
CBHI may be compared to the risk sharing solution in systems with full coverage and 
compulsory membership such as Norway where national insurance –premiums are paid through 
taxes.   
Mandatory enrolment can completely avoid the problem of adverse selection. It has been 
implemented in Ghana and Rwanda. The current Minister of Health in Rwanda stressed  that 
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they made CBHI compulsory because the voluntary, flat-rate scheme was never meant to be 
permanent ( Vogel 2011, 1).  
 
When mandatory enrolment is not an option other measures can be taken. Group enrolment is 
one such measure to reduce the risk of adverse selection. If group enrolment is properly 
enforced, adverse selection can be reduced as it will ensure that all group members, sick and 
healthy, enroll. However, group enrolment may not entirely eliminate adverse selection as high-
risk groups may be more attracted to voluntary CBHI (e.g. households with many members with 
a chronic illness may enroll more).   
Banerjee and Duflo (2011, 50) supporting that idea of group enrollment asserts that, the trick is 
to start from a large pool of people who came together for some other reason than health- 
employees of a large firm, microcredit clients, card-carrying communists…and try to insure all 
of them.  At first glance, this strategy seems flawless but critical review will prove that it is not 
as adequate as it appears. For example, since it takes micro credit clients as a starting point, it 
might be easy to assume that it will cover everyone but as is usually the case, the poor of the 
poor usually do not have access to micro finance opportunities.  
It is in this light that this study argues that government involvement might be inevitable in terms 
of premium subsidy  for the poor and then  reduce the small risk pooling cause by the adverse 
selection. This is what Banerjee and Duflo seem to suggest when they argue, “…on the other 
hand, the poor clearly bear unacceptable risk… but for the time being, the government should 
pay a part of insurance premiums for the poor. There is already evidence that this could work…” 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 154 &155).  Premium subsidy is then a mechanism that can mitigate 
adverse selection. This is because premium subsidy by reducing the cost of buying health 
insurance attracts individuals with low risks (Selden 1999).  However, in the case of targeted 
subsidy, the impact on adverse selection is not clear. After subsidy if high-risk individuals from 
the targeted group enroll more than others, adverse selection will increase. However, if high-risk 
individuals are already enrolled from this group and the subsidy encourages the low-risk 
individuals to enroll, adverse selection will reduce. Also, CBHI schemes can introduce cross-
subsidization (the rich households pay a higher premium) as a means to bridge this financial gap 
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(ibid). This is the strategy that is being implemented by CBHI in Rwanda. With Ubudehe 
categories each household pays according to their level of income. Then the Government in 
partnership with donors pays for the poorest of the poor.  
Technical inputs for the design, management and monitoring of voluntary CBHI schemes are 
also essential to save these schemes from problems of adverse selection. 
It is also important to note that the degree of formality or in other words the organization of a 
system (whether formal or informal) influences the degree to which adverse selection is 
experienced. In mutual trust based systems such as community based health insurance systems, 
people are able to trust each other on a personal basis and in this regard may thus give more 
accurate information and chances of cheating are reduced  in that the opportunity might simply 
be unavailable as everyone knows almost everyone 
Moral Hazard 
Just like adverse selection, moral hazard problem is a serious problem in insurance. In the 
previous sections, it has been shown that there exist two sorts of  moral hazard: the ex-ante moral 
hazard and the post-moral hazard. To limit the ex-ante moral hazard which implies the reduction 
of care of health after joining a scheme, Debebe et al. (2012, 12) proposes educational and 
awareness-raising programs as a way of redressing the balance of prevention versus treatment.  
Jütting also buys into the idea of Debebe and argues that strong community participation can 
facilitate health education and sensitization of members in order to promote healthy behavior and 
the use of preventive services, as the members share a common interest in keeping the costs of 
health care low (Jütting 2000, 13). For example, the members of a self-governed CBHI 
comprising several villages in Benin realized that many cases of sickness and a considerable 
amount of health care costs reimbursed by the scheme originated from one distinct village. In 
consequence, CBHI members of that village and the local nurse organized sensitization sessions 
on water hygiene and vaccination (Garba and Cyr 1998). Members of the Kisiizi Hospital Health 
Society in Uganda cited health education on preventive medicine as one of the main benefits of 
the scheme (Musau 1999). 
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Tabor (2005, 38) asserts that the introduction of incomplete coverage, such as through co-
payments, seems a more cost-effective strategy to neutralize perverse incentives.  However, there 
is another argument that a  potential solution to encourage preventive action in a low-income 
community is not through co-payments or deductibles as it is suggested to deal with ex-post 
moral hazard but through a group contract designed to induce peer monitoring by limiting the 
number of claims.  
 
On the other hand, to fight against Post-moral hazard which refers to unnecessary use of health 
care services (intended overconsumption) once insured, Tabor suggests the use of pre-selected 
providers as a strategy but also co-payment (ibid). For example CBHI in Rwanda, to limit the 
overuse they   implemented a co-payment policy requiring ten percent of the health care cost at 
the hospital level. Another viable method in view of Barr (1993, 780) is to limit insurance 
coverage to only particular types of treatment such as orthopedic operations and dentist service. 
It is argued that in this way, insurers can for example increase premiums depending on the type 
of cover sought as well as providing deductibles where the customer is to pay a certain first 
amount of the any claim or basically just that the client pays a certain percentage of the claim. 
Although a workable solution, this strategy risks discouraging demand for treatment instead of 
curtailing moral hazard only and in this regard should be implemented with great caution.   
 
Barr (ibid, 780) further argues that the alternative would be for insurers to influence the supply 
side by restricting treatment to certain providers. These providers would then have to face 
competition to retain insurers approved status. Given that this too may not curtail moral hazard 
as treatment providers may primarily concerned with their image there by effecting measures 
that do not adequately deal with the needs of clients.  
In Rwanda, the manager of CBHI at Muhima district  Hospital  revealed that to limit overuse of 
health service by CBHI insured, they impose controlled referral system.  Access to secondary 
and tertiary level care requires an authorized referral from the lower level health provider.  For 
that manager of CBHI at Muhima district  Hospital , a regulated referral mechanism discourages 
frivolous use of more expensive hospital services. Under this system, health centers play a 
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gatekeeper function for district hospital utilization and district hospitals on their part play a 
gatekeeper function for tertiary hospital utilization.   
 
Fraud  
To fight against fraud, a number of strategies have been pointed out by different authors. Tabor 
recommends a high level of community participation (Tabor 2005, 40).  The degree of 
community participation in the design and running of the CBHI can vary widely and is usually 
greater if funds are owned and managed by the members themselves than if schemes are run by 
health facilities. If members can identify themselves with “their” schemes because they control 
the funds and have decision-making power, they will tend less to unnecessary use of health care 
services.  
 
Another way of fighting against fraud refers to a proper record keeping and accounting. For 
example the CBHI known as “mutuelles de santé” in Rwanda has a system of MIS (management 
of Information System) that helps to keep all information about the members. In addition,  all 
health facilities at sector level have a patient register, a membership register, a financial ledger 
and a receipt book for cash received. They are required to generate a daily and a monthly status 
report, summarizing all transactions of the fund. Initial signs are that the record keeping 
procedures have helped to reduce fraud. 
    
To avoid fraud and abuses, the system is being strengthened continuously through various 
initiatives, including computerization of mutuelle management and membership cards with 
photographs of the cardholder.   
Also, providers have to deny service to the uninsured, to bill only for services rendered, and to 
render only those services that are truly required. Patients, staff and providers need to know that 
there will be sanctions for fraudulent claims. 
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III. 2. 2 Possible strategies for Design feature problems 
 
The main problems related to design features, discussed in previous section, are small risk pools, 
high start-up costs, under pricing due to lack of information to set prices and weak management 
capacity.  
To limit those challenges, this section discusses about possible strategies. To start with small risk 
pools, CBHI’s cope successfully with the problems posed by small membership pools in a 
number of ways. To avoid excessive financial instability, program coverage focuses on a smaller 
number of more “predictable” health risks. Financial risk is shared between the program 
beneficiaries (through co-payments) and providers (through capitation payments). Faced with 
volatile costs, premiums are regularly adjusted by member consent (Tabor 2005, 31).   
 
Tabor also argues that cooperation amongst CBHIs, which involves sharing premiums and 
benefit payout obligations, is another way in which risk pools can be enlarged. This can take the 
form of establishing partnerships between a CBHI and a formal, regulated insurer. It can involve 
the use of guarantee funds (by some of the largest networks of CBHIs) and the buildup of 
technical reserves. In several countries, networks of CBHIs have been formed to help pool risks, 
to interface with government, and to share technical information and training. In some cases, 
CBHI have been integrated into existing micro-finance networks, with the savings pools of the 
micro-finance institution used to offset a certain portion of the insurance risk (Ibid).  
 
Concerning the high start-up costs, one of the ways of reducing high start up costs (and 
expanding risk pools) is to develop regional bodies that can provide technical support to new 
CBHIs. For example, the GRAIM (Groupe de Recherche et d’Appui aux Initiatives Mutualistes) 
in the Thies region of Senegal has evolved into a forum for supporting the coordination of 21 
mutual health schemes. The GRAIM provides leadership advice and capacity building services 
in scheme design, financial management and administrative systems, in addition to training 
mutual health committees. The GRAIM has also become an active proponent of CBHIs and 
represents regional schemes in negotiations with Government and health providers (Tabor 2005, 
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32). Participatory processes sometimes substitute for more methodical, higher-cost, start-up 
processes. CBHI scheme in Rwanda serve a good example when it comes to the use of 
participatory methods in order to save the costs. There are volunteer health community workers, 
four health workers by each village, who are involved in sensitization and collecting premiums. 
There are also committees of users who provide support in management.   
 
Regarding the problem of under pricing, the main solution to this is to price predictably. The 
designers and managers of CBHIs  should take into consideration the extensiveness of the 
benefits package, the size of co-payments, and the availability of other sources of co-financing 
(i.e. donor or government subsidies)  because all those factors  have an influence on the size of 
the premium. CBHIs should regularly adjust premiums as more information on actual costs and 
market penetration becomes available. 
 
Concerning the problem of management capacity,  the regular training both in management and 
book keeping, but also in pricing of health risks seems to be a good solution to overcome 
deficiency in management.  McCord argues that the relative success of the Zimbabwean and 
South African medical aid societies is related to their regular training programs which have 
produced large numbers of highly skilled management, who are able to price health risks fairly 
accurately and maintain proper accounts (McCord 2001).  Also, integrating hands-on 
management controls with information systems can help CBHIs cut costs and improve service. 
Microcare (Uganda),  for example, use a check-in desk of their own in their provider facilities to 
verify eligibility and track utilization. This information is fed directly into their computerized 
MIS system to ensure that only covered patients gain access to approved services and that 
facilities do not over-bill for services (McCord 2002). 
 
Apart from capacity building of CBHI managers and information management, the management 
incentives have also an important influence on the operation of CBHIs. If remuneration is 
independent of the size of the risk pool, management may have insufficient incentives to engage 
in marketing or awareness building. Where remuneration is linked to recruiting new members, 
policy holder renewals may suffer, causing attrition rates to rise. In recognition of the importance 
46 
 
of aligning incentives with desired results, CBHIs have structured remuneration and staff 
performance monitoring systems to reward staff for increasing the size of the risk pool, 
educating members, and delivering good quality service (Tabor 2005, 36). 
 
III. 2. 3 Possible strategies to overcome challenges related to contextual consideration 
 
As earlier discussed the problems related to context include poverty, awareness and coveriate 
risk and  they deplete the implimentation of CBHI.  
Tabor points out that to respond to the problem of poverty, the use of co-payments to reduce the 
up-front cost of insurance and cross-subsidization (by members, donors and governments) are 
amongst the other ways that CBHIs make health insurance affordable even in very poor 
communities (Tabor 2005, 28). According to him there are many CBHIs that have a solidarity 
fund that is financed by a small premium mark-up and is used to subsidize membership by the 
very poor. For example, in South Borgou, Benin there are two mutual health organizations that 
have established solidarity funds to pay premiums for handicapped, elderly and destitute persons. 
There is also the example of a mutual health organization in Senegal in which members pay the 
premium for street children (Ibid).  
 
Some CBHIs have a sliding-scale for premiums based on income, and other CBHIs have a 
savings-scheme that allows households to set aside small amounts over time to pay their 
premium costs. For example, in Rwanda, the population is classified into different categories 
according to their revenues (income) and the premiums for CBHI are paid accordingly.  Also, in 
Rwanda, the system of Tontine9 helped many poor people to pay their premiums.  
When mutuals first started in Rwanda, 7% of household paid their premium through tontine 
system (Morestin & Ridde 2009, 4). In the following years, the mutuals signed agreements with 
credit cooperatives so that the latter would make loans in the amount of the annual premium 
(ibid)  
 
                                                 
9
 Tontine : System in which a group of people create a pool into which everyone deposits the same amount on fixed 
dates and from which, at every date of deposit, one participant is designated to receive all the deposits. 
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However this strategy is not directed at households who are permanently without money, but 
rather to those who are moderately poor and able to pay the premium, although not all at once. 
 
As another proposed solution, scheduling premium collection at the right time of the year can 
help improve access to the poor, especially when their incomes are highly seasonal. According to 
a study in the region of Thiès (Senegal), households in the poorest quintile use primarily harvest 
earnings to pay the premium. If a lump-sum payment is required, it must at least be after the 
harvest. Households in the Nouna district of Burkina Faso have recently requested that 
memberships in mutuals be paid in this period. However, a study in Guinea-Conakry points out 
that even at harvest time, some are too poor to gather together the necessary sum (ibid, 5) 
 
 CBHIs also can make health care more accessible to the poor by addressing a number of the 
non-financial barriers that deter/discourage poor households from joining. This includes bringing 
health service providers to remote villages and helping to change the attitude of providers to the 
treatment of the poor.   
 
 Regarding awareness problem, the CBHI must offer a good benefit package in order to make it 
attractive even for those who have reticence about medical insurance.  The solution is to provide 
coverage for a mix of hospitalization and primary health care services-this helps make the 
insurance service more desirable to target beneficiaries since all are likely to make some use of 
the scheme during the course of a year. Clients must fully understand what they are buying 
before premiums are paid if they are to be expected to renew their coverage. Research has shown 
that when clients do not understand what they are buying, they will perceive that they are not 
getting their money’s worth because they were unable to access the health care that they 
expected (McCord 2001).  
Also public education can in partly solve the problem of awareness because it has been shown 
that the CBHIs that have encouraged effective communications and client education are 
rewarded by a high level of member participation and low dropout rates.   
 
To respond to covariant risk, there is a need for partnerships, either with donors or government. 
Some of the ways in which CBHIs have succeeded in managing covariant risk is to include 
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policy limits on total payouts and to exclude categories of diseases or chronic conditions likely to 
pose large covariant risk. 
First-dollar coverage policies are sometimes used to ensure that the cost of treatment beyond a 
specified amount is either born by the Government or by the policy holder. Often governments 
(and/or their development partners) provide implicit reinsurance to CBHIs for losses incurred 
during periods of substantial covariate risk. For example, a malaria epidemic in southwestern 
Uganda cost the Kisiizi Hospital Health Society about 8.5 million Uganda Shilling ($6,500) 
(McCord and Osinde 2002). As a result, in 1998, no more than 64% of the Societies expenditures 
could be covered by their premiums. The Ministry of Health accepted responsibility for the costs 
due to the epidemic, and although no formal reinsurance agreement was in place, reimbursed the 
scheme for their losses (ibid). 
III. 3 LESSONS TO LEARN FROM RWANDA  
 
Rwanda has come a very long way since the terrible events of 1994, rebuilding out of the ruins 
of conflict to create a forward-looking country that nevertheless continues to face a number of 
challenges. Landlocked and densely populated, Rwanda is one of the world’s poorest nations but 
also it is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa to successfully integrate bottom-up and top-
down financing (pooling, more specifically) arrangements – community based health insurance 
(CBHI) know as “Mutuelles de santé” working in concert with a government led financing effort 
that, together, are building a national health financing system that is tailored to the specific 
requirements of the country.  
 
In fact, Rwanda’s mutuelle health insurance scheme has been consistently served  as a model of 
how community health insurance can be scaled up to achieve large scale improvements in access 
and health outcomes. For example,  over the first decade, national Mutuelle de Santé in Rwanda 
covered more than 90% of the population, has reduced out-of-pocket spending for health from 
28% to 12% of total health expenditure, and increased service use to 1·8 contacts per year 
(Makaka et al. 2012, 1) 
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 However, the role of the mutuelle scheme in achieving recent health improvements in Rwanda 
has often been exaggerated without consideration of other vital factors. This section then 
discusses different factors that contribute to the success of CBHI in Rwanda   
III.3.1 comprehensive health financing policy 
 
The development of CBHI is a key part of the Rwandan success story because it is embedded 
within a comprehensive health financing policy that differentiates Rwanda’s experience from 
other, less successful CBHI experiences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1.  CBHI (Mutuelle) experience in Rwanda  and other African Countries. 
Rwanda’s experience with mutuelle development shares similarities with other African countries that 
have been leaders in community-based health insurance (CBHI), such as Ghana and Senegal. 
However, the three country experiences differ in the types of community-based health financing 
schemes, the policy context, the modes of intervention, and the patterns of interaction of key actors. 
They are also differentiated by how they combine intervention modes to provide a supportive 
environment for CBHI development. Senegal, Ghana and Rwanda have all made the extension of 
social protection through mutuelles a cornerstone of their revised poverty reduction strategies. But 
the major difference among them is that Senegal has not yet demonstrated the political will and 
leadership to put in place an institutional framework for scaling-up of mutuelles. Community 
initiatives continue to emerge with support from NGOs and external partners, but with no support 
from the central government or local government units. Consequently, no formal relations exist yet 
between mutuelles and traditional health financing mechanisms in Senegal. 
The Rwandan institutional and political experience is very different from the laissez-faire approach 
that continues to prevail in Senegal, and the directive and top-down approach of Ghana. The 
political will and leadership in Rwanda has remained strong in the promotion of mutuelles, as 
currently in Ghana. But strengthening community participation in the health sector was among the 
original objectives of the mutuelle policy initiative in an environment in which political and 
decentralization reforms promoted empowerment and participation. Thus, Rwandan actors and 
promoters of CBHI remained mindful of maintaining a balance between a top-down approach of 
state intervention and a bottom-approach for ensuring of state intervention and a bottom-approach 
for ensuring that mutuelles were well rooted at cell, sector, and district levels. 
Source:  Health Financing Task Force Discussion Paper: Policy Crossroads for Mutuelles 
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It is important to acknowledge the improvements in access to health care that have come about as the 
result of a process of carefully orchestrated health financing strategy that includes: fiscal and 
managerial decentralization and increased government spending on health (government budget 
allocated to health has risen from 8.2% 2005, to around 10.2% for 2009-2010 (WHO 2010), and 
increased external funding for health, with a substantial amount used to support the CBHI-based 
mechanism rather than to finance parallel systems. Finally, the introduction of strategic purchasing of 
health services under the label of “performance based financing” (PBF10) as a national policy has 
brought about a fundamental change in the way that health facilities and their staff are motivated to 
strive for greater quality and efficiency (Ministry of Health 2010).  
 
Also, while the network of mutual health insurance schemes known as mutuelles is at the core of the 
Rwandan success story, it is the linking of the different levels (community, district, and national) in a 
coherent and complementary manner, and the establishment of a bottom-up mechanism that pools 
resources under a national strategy and provides mechanisms for cross subsidization that makes them 
so effective.  
III.3.2 Good leadership and decentralization of health sector  
 
Strong and committed leadership, vision and accountability mechanisms at all levels are vital to 
successful CBHI in Rwanda.  
In order to be successful in implementing any kind of large scale scheme, there must be a clear 
vision and related policy objectives set forth by the government. Then, under the leadership of 
the Rwandan Government, the program to establish an effective national system of health 
insurance was made a core government priority agenda in Vision 20/20, Economic Development 
and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) and Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) (WHO 2013, 
4). Also, the success of mutuelles  is in part a result of government ability to enforce local 
implementation through  fiscal and managerial decentralization.  
 
The government of Rwanda has tried to decentralize all implementation of health care policy, 
with the central government responsible for stewardship activities only (e.g., including policy 
                                                 
10
 Performance based financing, or ‘pay-4-performance’ or ‘output based aid’ as it is generally referred to, consists 
of a family of various methods and approaches that all aim, through differing levels of intervention, at linking 
incentives to performance by Louis Rusa 
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development, capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, and resource mobilization). Risk 
pooling for mutuelles is managed at both the central and district levels. The central level 
manages subsidy funds obtained through non-mutuelle insurance funds, charitable organizations, 
NGOs, development partners, and the Government of Rwanda. This national solidarity fund 
channels subsidies down to the district mutuelle solidarity funds as well as to tertiary hospitals 
for care of mutuelle members who are referred by district hospitals (Kayonga 2007, 4).  The 
reality is that the Rwanda success story is due the way the government has used the resources 
available to it to increase coverage and boost performance. 
 
According to the interview with the manager of CBHI “mutuelles de santé” in district of 
Nyarugenge in Rwanda, the job of district is to ensure that there is an equitable and efficient use 
of resources at the local level. The district government oversees a network of what are relatively 
autonomous facilities, comprised of district hospitals and health centers, that are either public, 
government assisted, not-for-profit (mostly faith based), or private institutions. The district 
government also oversees the network of autonomous mutuelle branches within the districts and 
manages a district pool that covers costs for first level referral hospital visits for the mutuelle 
members. Being closer to the people, the district is better positioned to identify and address 
needs more efficiently and effectively 
 
The sector level CBHI facilitates the recruitment of members through mobilization of the 
population to subscribe to CBHI by enhancing the capacities of mobilization committees in 
villages, cells and sectors  
 
He added that the communities form the base of the bottom-up pillar of the Rwanda health 
system architecture. In order to get community input, the district governments make decisions in 
consultation with various community committees.  The communities also play a key role in the 
management of the facilities through participation on the hospital boards, while elected 
community representatives manage the mutuelle branches.  
 
Another aspect of good leadership is how the Ministry of Health in Rwanda improves capacity 
building, monitoring and evaluation of CBHI sections.  Ministry of Health has different technical 
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units such as the “Cellule d’Appui Tchnique aux Mutuelles de Santé” (CTAMS) that support the 
district and sub-district levels in managing and monitoring the mutuelles, and the “Cellule 
d’appui à l’approche contractuelle” (CAAC) that supports the service purchasing related to PBF. 
These support units are made up of experts from a range of disciplines including policy and 
planning, health economics, human resources and institutional development, monitoring and 
evaluation (WHO 2013, 1). In addition, information is compiled using information technology, 
notably electronic health records and national reporting systems. At the district and national 
levels, health centers use technologically advanced health-surveillance systems.  
 This technical support comes to resolve the mentioned problem of weak management that 
normally hinders the good implementation of CBHI. 
It is also important to note that Rwanda has proved strong political commitment and leadership 
to attain universal coverage by paying premiums for indigents under CBHI. It has also made the 
enrollment to CBHI mandatory to all Rwandan without any other medical insurance. A patient I 
met at Muhima District Hospital revealed that without mandatory enrollment many people would 
not have joined the CBHI schemes, just because of bad understanding of benefits of medical 
insurance. Most of them they don’t see direct benefits as they think they might not fall sick 
during the whole year.  
In brief, it should be noted that the commitment of very powerful national leadership to effective 
implementation and accountability at local level has driven success in Rwanda: other countries 
may have differing capacities to take advantage of these lessons 
III.3.3 Cultural factor 
 Another success factor is related to cultural factors: CBHI in Rwanda is one of the home grown 
solutions11 initiated by Rwandan government.  A defining characteristic of these initiatives is 
their roots in the local community. Typically they have taken the form of small community based 
mechanisms or pre-payment systems set up and managed by local health facilities. The 
                                                 
11
 Development strategies that are grounded in Rwandan tradition  
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importance of local ownership was recognized when the government began to focus on ways to 
meet the challenge of how to pay for health back in 1999 (Diop et al. 2007, 24). Thus, from the 
outset, Rwanda’s health financing strategy was designed to build on existing strengths.  
According to ODI study, there are socio-cultural and political institutions and practices in 
Rwanda’s history, which in the past served the purpose of promoting social and political order, 
and whose abandonment in the pursuit of modernity contributed significantly to the 
destabilization of society and the country’s politics. These include: ubudehe mu kurwanya 
ubukene (collective action to combat poverty), gacaca (informal conflict settlement 
arrangements), imihigo (competitive performance contracts and accountability mechanisms), 
itorero ry’igihugu, (cultural mentoring and leadership training) and umuganda (communal 
work). All those social cultural practices have been revived in modern way and now help the 
country to solve different problems among of others medical insurance for people from informal 
sector.  
 
Two of those cultural practices: Ubudehe and Imihigo are largely contributing to the success of 
CBHI in Rwanda (Chambers & Golooba-Mutebi 2012, 43). The same study proves that the 
ubudehe initiative is akin to a longstanding tradition of mutual self-help within local 
communities. In one of its most widespread forms, farming households help each other with land 
clearing, planting and, eventually bringing in the harvest. In its official form it has, among other 
things, facilitated the implementation of national poverty eradication initiatives. Implementation 
starts with classification of poor people, thereby enabling the poorest and most vulnerable 
households to be identified by their fellow villagers. In this way they become the priority 
recipients of any support available from the government or its development partners, including 
payment of mutuelle subscriptions. Inclusion of payment for mutuelle has helped extend mutuelle 
coverage to poor households that would otherwise not have the capacity to pay for themselves 
(ibid, 44) 
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Another cultural practice that helped the Rwandan government to implement CBHI successfully 
is “Imihigo12” (performace contracts). In the local policy environment the annual performance 
contracts have played an important role in efforts to improve service delivery, as they act as ‘an 
implementation device’ for the District Development Plans (Government of Rwanda, 2007).   A 
manager of CBHI at Muhima district Hospital confirmed that one of the indicators of 
performance in the Imihigo contracts between the president and district mayors is the coverage 
of mutuelles. This reflects a strong commitment at high level for the development of mutuelles, 
but also creates the incentive for district mayors to enforce enrolment. 
 
In fact, Imihigo are playing a great role in the success of CBHI as they include important 
objectives for attainment by local authorities at all levels. Among of others they include the 
acquisition of health care facilities, subscription to the community health insurance scheme, 
family planning uptake, antenatal service usage, training of CHWs, delivery under the 
supervision of skilled personnel, at health units. National-level prioritization and pressure for 
implementation have helped keep the delivery of these services high on the political agenda.  
 
III.3.4 Public education or social mobilization 
 
 The CBHI managers from Muhima district Hospital and from Gihogwe health center believe 
that in Rwanda, volunteer community health workers play a pivotal role in catalyzing and 
pushing for behavior change and in ensuring that key national and local policies are implemented 
at the local level right down to the village. Similar initiatives have been mostly unsuccessful 
elsewhere in Africa. 
 
A number of strategies are used to ensure that efforts to improve the enrollment to “mutuelle de 
santé” schemes start at the grassroots level through on-going educational activities and where 
necessary, awareness campaigns designed to induce behavioral change. Public awareness 
campaigns have played a pivotal role in educating the population about the importance of certain 
                                                 
12
 Annual imihigo performance contracts, in which the goals necessary to achieve national and local development 
objectives are agreed upon, are drawn up between the President of Rwanda and the district mayors and used as a 
mechanism to hold districts to account for progress towards these objectives  
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policies and practices, and consequently, in encouraging behavior change. There are community-
level, multi-actor sensitization campaigns which raise awareness of different issues and which 
can be credited with contributing to improvement in service provision. These campaigns often 
have specific objectives such as increasing the number of mutuelle subscriptions and raising 
awareness with regard to a whole range of things.  
 
In fact, other countries should take into consideration the unique and strong sense of community 
orientation that is essential in building CBHI in Rwanda and scaling it to the national level. As 
shown in previous paragraphs, in Rwanda, most of government programs have roots in the strong 
community-oriented culture; the mutuelles were built from the grassroots level up to the national 
level to ensure large uptake and scale up.  
III. 3. 5 Social capital 
 
Social capital is also a crucial factor. The theoretical part of this study demonstrated that schemes 
characterized by strong intra-community ties are more likely to experience success in CBHI than 
those without these ties. In Rwanda, 1994 genocide against Tutsi had torn the social cohesion of 
Rwandan society. However, after that tragic period, the government of national unity prioritized 
the unit and reconciliation of all Rwandans and this objective has been achieved at great level.  
The restored social cohesion contributed a lot to the success of CBHI implementation in a way 
that people within the community initiated “mutual groups” and they set up a system where 
households used a savings and loan association to save enough money to join a prepayment 
insurance scheme. Overall villagers have embraced these associations. Poor people who 
previously found it difficult to pay their health insurance in one go find that the system facilitates 
their payment by allowing them to save gradually.  
 
In brief, those are main lessons that have characterized the Rwandan mutuelle experience and 
distinguished it among other African mutuelle experiences. Despite the limitations of the 
mutuelle strategy, the country’s collective policies have helped it achieve historic gains.  
However, some international commentators disproportionately underscore the mutuelle’s role in 
these achievements and oversell community insurance as a financing panacea for others to adopt 
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solely on its basis. It is important for all aspects of Rwanda’s success to be acknowledged and 
studied for broader adaptation and, in particular, its increasing and strategic investments in 
health, strong economic performance, uniquely effective public administration, and popular buy-
in to government initiatives. Indeed, these other factors are part of the reason why the mutuelle 
as a program has been as successful as it has. 
Also, Rwanda’s leadership should be lauded for their impressive accomplishments. Policymakers 
in countries looking to follow in their footsteps need to take the Rwanda model as a whole and 
look at the mutuelle program more critically to understand its relative merits and many 
limitations rather than simply buying the hype.  Talking about limitation, the CBHI in Rwanda is 
criticized to be greatly subsidized by the government and development partners. Then its 
sustainability is questioned in case the subsidies are not available.   
 
III.4 CONCLUSION   
 
In many countries, new forms of risk sharing at the local level are developing. Community Based 
Health Insurance schemes (CBHIs) are a prominent example. They rely on pooling of resources 
by community members through the prepayment of premiums. This study showed that while it 
has been reported in the literature that such schemes can substantially reduce transaction costs 
and help to better protect poor people against health shocks, many of them fail because of a 
number of problems related to their implementation. However, throughout this study I have 
demonstrated that there are certain settings in which CBHIs have performed well, especially in  
the case of Rwanda, where more than 90% of the population is insured by  the country’s CBHI. 
 
The main purpose of this research has been to study the known problems in implementing 
community-based health insurance policies in developing countries and the strategies that help to 
overcome those problems.  The lessons from the case of Rwanda have been discussed in order to 
analyze if Rwanda can serve as a model for other developing countries which failed to 
implement CBHIs. Based on extensive literature review and on some informal interviews with 
some users and managers of the CBHI in Rwanda, I found that among the main challenges 
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hampering the implementation of the CBHI are problems related to insurance risk, design 
features and contextual considerations. 
 
The findings suggested two main problems related to insurance risk such as adverse selection 
and moral hazard. Adverse selection is an important concern for any voluntary health insurance 
scheme since more sick individuals will join than others. In the context where a CBHI serves 
primarily poor populations, this problem is more severe. As solutions, the literature and 
interviews proposed mandatory enrolment and household-membership as opposed to individual 
subscription.  
 
In addition, the introduction of cross-subsidization (the rich households pay a higher premium) 
has been recommended as a means to bridge the financial gap due to adverse selection. I found 
that this solution is being applied in Rwanda and good results are expected.  
 
Apart from adverse selection, I have also found that moral hazard is a serious problem that slows 
down the performance of CBHIs. The literature showed that moral hazard is due to unjustified 
use of services at either the primary or the secondary level, without any real necessity—an 
attitude induced by the very fact of  being insured and having easier access to health services .  
Moral hazard can be induced both by patients and by providers.  
 
Scholars have showed that there are two kinds of moral hazards: ex-ante moral hazard due to 
reduced care of health after joining a scheme and the ex-post moral hazard due to 
overconsumption of medical services (Ahuja, Jütting 2003, 13).  
 
In Rwanda, fraudulent use of the insurance scheme by non-members has been reported in 
Muhima district hospital. A number of measures have been suggested in the literature to mitigate 
problems caused by moral hazard. Those measures include educational awareness campaigns to 
enhance healthy behavior, co-payment and to limit insurance coverage to only particular types of 
illnesses.  However, this list of measures is not exhaustive. It should also take into consideration 
the context of different CBHIs, as all of them are not identical.  
58 
 
 
Besides problems related to insurance risk, I found that the success of a scheme is hindered by a 
number of challenges related to its design features such as small risk pools, under pricing, 
inadequate coverage, high start-up costs and weak management.  Different authors have showed 
that weak CBHI management capacity includes a failure to adequately manage insurance risks, 
unrealistic premiums, the absence of a community business culture, low controls for fraud and 
limited coverage (and hence high risk of adverse selection).   
 
It also implies the absence of qualified staff trained in insurance, lack of marketing surveys to 
link products to perceived needs, limited marketing beyond the pilot phase, poor data handling 
and management capacities, and stiff competition from highly subsidized government hospitals 
and national social health insurance agencies (McCord and Osinde 2002, Musau 1999). To solve 
such problems, the literature considers that permanent training both in management and book 
keeping, as well as in pricing of health risks seems to be an appropriate remedy to overcome 
deficiency in management. 
 
Apart from problems related to insurance risk and design features, the literature proved that there 
are also problems related to the context in which CBHIs are launched. Those problems, when 
unaddressed, slow down the performance of CBHIs. Such problems mainly include poverty, 
awareness problems and covariate risk.  
 
In fact, it has been shown that health risks are a major concern for the poor but the participation 
in community financing schemes requires resources (like money), which the most disadvantaged 
groups in societies often do not possess.  Furthermore, there is an awareness problem due to the 
absence of a formal insurance culture, and a consequent lack of trust in insurance-type 
arrangements whereby clients pay in advance for a service that they may or may not receive in 
the future.  
 
Scholars advocate that empowering informal sector households, including the poor, to better 
manage their health risks, in a financially efficient and effective manner. It can be an important 
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part of the solution to the complex nexus of poverty and health problems.  Also, the subsidization 
by donors and the government is another way to help the poor to access medical insurance. 
Client education, through awareness campaigns, can lead to behavior change and remove the 
poor mindset about medical insurance.  
 
Many countries have failed to successfully implement CBHIs due to the already mentioned 
problems. Few others have had success in one or several specific areas, but all face several 
challenges. The case of Rwanda reveals progress. Caution provides that its success  should not 
be considered as perfection; however, it does offer valuable insights in the steps Rwanda has 
taken in order to move towards Universal Coverage, and as such presents valuable lessons 
learned to inspire other countries. 
   
As this study has attempted to show, one of the most remarkable aspects of the Rwanda success 
story is the way the government has used the resources available to increase coverage and boost 
performance.  The World Health Organization has proved that that the success of the CBHI in 
Rwanda is in partly due to increased government spending on health. For example, the 
government budget allocated to health has risen from 8.2% in 2005, to around 10.2% in  2009-
2010 (WHO2010).  
 
Also, donors are delivering financial and technical assistance through the mutuelles rather than 
through parallel channels. The level of funding provided by donors is also substantial, with 
external resources exceeding 50% of Total Health Expenditure (ibid). This relative abundance of 
resources has of course been enormously helpful to policy makers, but it also represents one of 
the most important challenges: how to sustain the benefits of the system in the long term. 
 
The study has also demonstrated that the success of the CBHI in Rwanda has been driven by the 
commitment of a very powerful national leadership to effective implementation and 
accountability at the local level. This effective implementation has been possible through 
participatory decentralization of community health workers (CHWs) that has brought services 
closer to communities and empowered them to participate in their own development.  
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Decentralization induced community support, which is an important factor in achieving high 
levels of uptake and continued enrolment in the scheme.  
 
Members of the CBHI in Rwanda are involved in a variety of activities including overall 
coordination, community sensitization, encouragement and advice. In addition, CBHI success is 
due to the system of home grown solutions initiated by Rwandan government. This unique and 
original way is founded seen as a permanent solution to governance and development problems, 
including health problems.  
 
CBHIs, known  as “Mutuelles de santé,” are one of the home grown solutions to extend medical 
insurance to low income households, especially from the informal sector and rural areas. Other 
home grown solutions like “ubudehe” and “imihigo” have contributed immensely to the success 
of the CBHI in Rwanda. The ubudehe initiative allowed the classification of the Rwandan 
population according to their income, which helped determine the premiums they pay, according 
their level of incomes. The rich pay more than the poor. This helps to fill the financial gap and to 
increase the pooling risk. “Imihigo,” competitive performance contracts and accountability 
mechanisms, have pushed local leaders to increase subscription to the community health 
insurance scheme. They have acted as incentives for local leaders to work hard and get the 
population sensitized about the benefits of the CBHI and then to adhere to it massively. 
 
All these factors combined contribute to the success of CBHIs in Rwanda. They also make it a 
likely model for other developing countries. However, the literature provides a warning that 
countries should not blindly copy schemes that have worked well in a different setting, but that 
they should take each case as unique. This requires unique solutions to common problems related 
to the implementation of CBHIs.  
 
The problems are common but solutions must be applied according to the context in which the 
CBHI is launched. There is an argument that community financing schemes are no panacea for 
the problems that low income countries face in resource mobilization. They should be regarded 
as a complement to – not a substitute —strong government involvement in health care financing 
and risk management related to the cost of illness. 
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There is hope that the future will show if there are ways to overcome common failings of CBHI 
in many schemes. These include limited participation, low cost recovery rates and the problems 
of including the poorest members of society (Creese and Bennett 1997). Finally, future research 
should address the question of how subsidies for the poorest in a community can be designed in 
order to preserve the incentives for a viable management of the schemes and to achieve optimal 
targeting. In addition, more research is needed on other promising measures to fight social 
exclusion in access to social protection in low income environments. 
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